Intel Shareholder Fraud over iViewit Technologies Still Undisclosed by Intel CEO Paul Otellini

"iViewit Technologis SEC COMPLAINT against INTEL CORPORATION

White Collar Crime Division and Any and All Compliance Division Heads and Related
Offices:

I, Eliot Bernstein, of ..... Street, Boca Raton, Florida 33434 as the Original Owner and Inventor of key "backbone technologies" for video and imaging as further described herein, am filing this Formal Complaint against Intel Corporation ( Intel ) with United States headquarters located at 2200 Mission College Blvd, Santa Clara, Ca, 95054-1459, and bring to your attention ongoing investigations involving multiple federal offices around the country as well as International investigations pertinent in this
matter.

Intel is a primary wrongdoer as a named defendant in a presently Pending Trillion
Dollar international RICO Conspiracy Lawsuit involving the theft and fraud of my Intellectual Property rights as further set out herein.

In addition to liabilities claimed in this lawsuit, are separate direct primary liabilities and obligations from signed agreements including Non Disclosure’s, Strategic Partner Agreements and Licensing Agreements.

Further, on information and belief Intel corporate management including at least the
President, Paul S. Otellini and corporate counsel Bruce D. Sewell, and Stephen R.
Rodgers are also involved in an ongoing and undisclosed massive international Fraud
against the Intel shareholders and investors.

Upon information and belief, the frauds include but are not limited to the failure
to disclose both the lawsuit and the Intellectual Property Infringements in direct violation
of various SEC laws and rules including but not limited to FASB No. 5 requirements for
disclosing liabilities and more.

Merely one claim in this lawsuit involves the attempted Murder upon my family by an Iraqi style car bombing that blew up three vehicles in addition to mine during the early phases of the high stakes corporate theft and fraud of my Intellectual Property Rights.

Notably, federal Judge Shira Scheindlin referred to this as a case involving Murder that has also been marked as legally “related” by Scheindlin to an ongoing Federal Whistleblower Case

In summary, dating back to 1998-1999 at the time the inventions were discovered,

I had Signed Non Disclosure Agreements, Strategic Alliance Agreements and Licensing

Arrangements, including Agreements that were at the time in legal review for R3D

relating to the USE of my Proprietary Rights in inventions which were hailed as the "Holy

Grail" of the internet.

The technologies were deemed the “Holy Grail” by multiple experts under signed NDA’s as it permitted full screen full frame rate video previously thought impossible and zoom and pan imaging technologies which removed pixel distortion.

The stolen technologies are now commonly found on virtually all digital imaging and video hardware and software.

These Signed Agreements were amongst hundreds of signed agreements with many Fortune 1000 Companies.

After signing Agreements with Real 3D, Inc. ( R3D ), a company whose ownership was composed of Lockheed Martin ( 70% ), Intel ( 20% ) and Silicon Graphics Inc. ( 10% ), Intel later took over complete ownership of R3D of Orlando Florida.

In the subsequent months thereafter, a series of critical events occurred including

but not limited to the discovery of fraudulent patent applications and the discovery of

fraudulent corporations, the corporate frauds were discovered by Arthur Andersen during

an audit for the largest investor in the companies Crossbow Ventures of W. Palm Beach

Florida.

Nearly two-thirds of the Crossbow funds were secured through SBIC Loans from

the Small Business Administration making the SBA the largest investor in the

technologies and companies.

On information and belief, the SBA Inspector General’s office is conducting an ongoing investigation into these and other matters please refer to the SBA Inspector General’s office to obtain relevant information.

As you will see by the letter and petition to the 44

the US President, Barack Hussein Obama II, found @

http://iviewit.tv/CompanyDocs/United%20States%20District%20Court%20Southern%20District%20NY/

20090213%20FINAL%20SIGNED%20LETTER%20OBAMA%20TO%20ENJOIN%20US%20ATTORNEY%20FINGERED%20ORIGINAL%20MAIL%20l.pdf

and also sent to US Attorney General Eric Holder, I was then directed by Harry I. Moatz,

Director of the United States Patent & Trademark Office, Office of Enrollment and

Discipline to file charges with the Commissioner of Patents claiming Fraud Upon the

USPTO, my companies and myself.

This led to the Suspension of certain Intellectual Properties while investigations remain ongoing; please refer to Moatz and the Commissioner of Patents office to obtain relevant information.

In addition, Moatz directed me to seek Congressional Legislation to obtain an Act of Congress to correct the falsified Oaths on my Intellectual Properties submitted by my former legal counsel at the law firms of Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein &; Schlissel, Foley &; Lardner and Proskauer Rose.

An Act of Congress is necessary to make the changes in inventors, owners and assignees

that are fraudulent, for which we have sought aid from The Honorable Senator Dianne

Feinstein who remains working through her offices regarding such.

These backbone technologies which were stolen in 1998-1999 have since been

used throughout the United States and across the globe throughout the entire value chain

of content creation and distribution of video and images for both software and hardware

in the transmission of Digital Video and Imaging across ALL Spectrums, including, the

Internet, Television, DVD, HD DVD, Micro Processing Chips, as well as, a mass of

applications for Defense, Flight & Space Simulation, including on the Hubble Space

Telescope (providing a deeper view into time) and on virtually all Medical Imaging

Devices, and more.

In fact, members of R3D and Intel were some of the earliest champions of the value of the technologies claiming they were “Priceless” and were valued in the hundreds of billions to trillions of dollars over the life of the Intellectual Properties, having transformed the world of Digital Imaging and Video that now are considered part of daily life.

Intel was one of the earliest players in this scheme and has continued to not only

defraud myself and the other rightful owners of the technologies, including Ellen

DeGeneres and Alanis Morissette, but has simultaneously defrauded the Intel's

shareholders and investors for years by failing to report and disclose the liabilities with

full knowledge of their Binding Obligations regarding the technologies.

These frauds and failures by the Intel management team have continued despite multiple communications over several years that have gone directly to the President of Intel, Mr. Paul S. Otellini and their Corporate Counsel Mr. Bruce D. Sewell and Steven R. Rodgers and continue despite the knowledge of the signed Agreements.

At this time, however, as noted in my Feb. 2009 letter to the Office of the US

President Barack Hussein Obama II and the US Attorney General Eric Holder, I wish to

bring to your direct attention the identities of several federal offices already involved in

this ongoing national and international Intellectual Properties theft and fraud.

Investigations that will aid and facilitate the SEC with background information for the

proper performance of complete investigations by the SEC allowing for information

sharing with these agencies, some of the key offices are as follows:

1. Glenn A. Fine, Office of Inspector General of the US Department of Justice

2. Harry Moatz, Director, OED of the USPTO

3. H. Marshall Jarrett, Office of Professional Responsibility of the FBI

4. A complete list of Federal, State & International Actions can be found @

http://iviewit.tv/CompanyDocs/INVESTIGATIONS%20MASTER.htm. ..."

Source of Post and Full Document on Intel Corp. Stealing
the iViewit Digital Video and Imaging Patent Pending Technologies.

http://www.iviewit.tv/CompanyDocs/United%20States%20District%20Court%20Southern%20District%20NY/20090325%20FINAL%20Intel%20SEC%20Complaint%20SIGNED2073.pdf


Posted here by

Investigative Blogger Crystal Cox

Crystal@CrystalCox.com

Iviewit Technologies - Original Conspirators? Letter From JOEL I. KLIEN Department of Justice. MPEG LA - Proskauer Rose Corruption.

Does This Letter Give Us a Clue on WHO who the Original People Conspiring in the Iviewit Patent Stealing and Massive Shareholder Fraud that Followed?

No wonder MPEG LA, Toshiba, Japan - is all over the blogs on Iviewit.. they DONE BAD !!!

"" Response to Hitachi, Ltd.'s, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.'...and Victor Company of Japan, Ltd.'s Request for Business Review Letter

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
JOEL I. KLIEN
Assistant Attorney General
Main Justice Building
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2401 (202) 514-
2401 / (202) 514-6543 (f)
antitrust@justice.usdoj.gov (internet)
http://www.usdoj.gov/
(World Wide
Web)
June 10, 1999
VIA FAX
Carey R. Ramos, Esq.
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10019-6064

Dear Mr. Ramos:

This letter is in response to your request on behalf of Hitachi, Ltd.,
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Corporation,
Time Warner Inc., Toshiba Corporation, and Victor Company of Japan,
Ltd. (collectively, the "Licensors"), for the issuance of a business review
letter pursuant to the Department of Justice's Business Review Procedure,
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Request for Business Review Letter

28 C.F.R. § 50.6. You have requested a statement of the Department of
Justice's antitrust enforcement intentions with respect to a proposed
arrangement pursuant to which Toshiba will assemble and offer a package
license under the Licensors' patents that are "essential," as defined below,
to manufacturing products in compliance with the DVD-ROM and DVDVideo
formats and will distribute royalty income to the other Licensors.

I. The DVD-ROM and DVD-Video Formats
The Standard Specifications for the DVD-ROM and DVD-Video formats
describe the physical and technical parameters for DVDs for read-onlymemory
and video applications, respectively, and "rules, conditions and
mechanisms" for player units for the two formats.(1) In either format, the
DVD has more than seven times the storage capacity of a compact disc; a
single-layer, single-sided DVD, for example, can store 4.7 billion bytes
(4.38 GB) of information including audio, video, text, and data. Employing
compression technology, a DVD-Video disc can hold a 135-minute feature
film on a single side.

The Licensors, along with a number of other producers of consumer
electronics hardware, software, or both,(2) established the Standard
Specifications.(3) These Standard Specifications appear to implicate the
intellectual property rights of numerous firms.

II. The Proposed Arrangement
A memorandum of understanding among the Licensors (the "MOU,"
attached as Exhibit 1 to your letter) sets forth the central terms of the
proposed arrangement, pursuant to which Toshiba will aggregate the
Licensors' "essential" patents and disseminate rights under them to
makers of Digital Versatile Discs (DVDs), DVD players, and DVD decoders

(4) ("DVD Products"), and distribute royalty income to the other Licensors.
The arrangement will be carried out through a group of other agreements,
including:

(1) a license that Toshiba will receive from each other Licensor
to enable Toshiba to license users of the Standard Specifications under
that Licensor's "essential" patents (the "Authorization Agreement,"
attached as Exhibit 3);

(2) Toshiba's sublicense to makers of DVD
Products under the Licensors' patents (the "DVD Patent License," attached
as Exhibit 2);

(3) an agreement among the Licensors concerning the
retention and authority of experts to select and evaluate the patents to be
licensed (the "Expert Agreement," attached as Exhibit 4); and (4) the
"Ground Rules for Royalty Allocation" (attached as Exhibit 7), which set
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forth the formula that will determine how Toshiba will distribute royalties
among the Licensors.

(5)A. The patents to be licensed
In the MOU, the Licensors commit to license each other and third parties
to make, use and sell DVD Products under their present and future
patents that are "essential" to doing so.

(6) The Licensors agree to two separate means of carrying out this obligation. First, they agree to grant Toshiba the right to sublicense third parties under their present and future "essential" patents for these purposes, and Toshiba agrees in turn to sublicense those patents, along with its own such patents, in the DVD
Patent Licenses.

(7) Second, each Licensor agrees to "offer to license its
essential DVD patents on a non-exclusive basis to interested third-party
licensees pursuant to separate negotiations on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory
terms, whether or not said third-party licensees intend to
make, use and sell DVD products that are in conformity with the
Specifications."

(8)A Licensor's patent is "essential," and thus subject to the commitments in
the MOU, if it is "necessarily infringed," or "there is no realistic alternative"
to it, "in implementing the DVD Standard Specifications."

(9) Initially, each
Licensor will identify its own "essential" patents in an attachment to its
Authorization Agreement with Toshiba.

(10) Toshiba will then incorporate
those patents in a list attached to the DVD Patent License.

(11) Shortly,however, an expert individual or panel, with "full and sufficient knowledge and skill in the relevant technology,"

(12) will complete a review the patents each Licensor has designated as "essential" in order to determine whether they satisfy the MOU criteria.

(13).MOU, ¶ 8; Expert Agreement, preamble.

(14) At that time, any patent initially designated by a Licensor for inclusion
in the DVD Patent License that the expert determines is not "essential" will
be excluded from subsequent DVD Patent Licenses, although current
licensees will have the option to retain it in their existing licenses.

(15)The expert will repeat this comprehensive review of all the patents in the
DVD Patent License portfolio every four years.

(16) In between the quadrennial reviews, the proposed program also provides a mechanism by which the expert may review individual patents whose essentiality comes
into question. If a Licensor comes to a good faith conclusion that a
licensed patent is not "essential," and provides a reasonable basis for that
belief, the expert will re-examine the patent.(17) If the expert concludes
that the patent is not "essential," the patent will be excluded from the
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DVD Patent License.

(18)The agreement provides that the expert's determinations are "conclusive
and non-appealable," although the expert must submit a report explaining
any decision that a patent was not "essential."

(19) Compensation will be at the expert's "standard hourly rates."(20) Each Licensor will bear the cost of the expert's review of its patents; the Licensors will share costs attributable to all of them, such as time spent reviewing the DVD Standard
Specifications.(21) The expert, although retained by the Licensors and
selected by a majority vote among them, will not have an economic
affiliation with any individual Licensor.(22) A majority of the Licensors may
remove the expert for failure or inability to perform the duties set forth in
the Expert Agreement "in a professional, competent, reliable or timely
manner."

(23) Although the proposed licensing program currently includes the patents of
only the Licensors, it is open to any owner of an "essential" patent willing
to license on the program's terms and conditions.

(24) B. The joint licensing arrangement In the Authorization Agreement, each Licensor grants Toshiba the nonexclusive right to grant:

(1) sublicenses, "substantially on the terms contained in the form of the DVD Patent License," on its "essential" patents to third parties to "make, have made, use, sell or otherwise dispose of DVD Products";

(25) and (2) releases to the same third parties from liability for pre-license infringement of the licensed patents.

(26)Toshiba assumes the obligation to grant such sublicenses and releases "to
all interested third party licensees,"(27) to collect royalties from licensees,
and to distribute royalty income to other Licensors.

(28) Consistent with the MOU, the Authorization Agreement preserves the
Licensors' right to license their "essential" patents independently for any
application.

(29) While the Licensors agree to provide each other with
notification of "infringement [of the portfolio patents] or other misuse or
unauthorized use" and to cooperate "in taking such steps as may be
reasonably necessary to prevent any such unauthorized uses,"

(30) each Licensor remains "solely responsible" for enforcing its own patent rights
against infringement.

(31) The Authorization Agreement requires Toshiba to charge royalties of $.075
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per DVD Disc and 4% of the net sales price of DVD players and DVD
decoders, with a minimum royalty of $4.00 per player or decoder.(32) It
provides that these royalty levels will remain unchanged by the addition of
any new members to the pool, unless a failure to raise royalties "would
cause a significant problem in maintaining or expanding the licensing
program."

(33)After deducting its licensing-administrator fee, Toshiba will distribute the
remaining royalties among the Licensors pursuant to an agreed allocation
formula set forth in the Ground Rules for Royalty Allocation.

(34).MOU, ¶ 8;Expert Agreement, preamble.

(35) This formula takes into account how often a Licensor's "essential" patents are infringed by either manufacture or sale of licensees' products, the age of the patents, and, in the case of patents "essential" to disc standards, whether the Licensor's patents relate to optional or mandatory features of the standard.

(36) Pursuant to the expert's quadrennial review of the portfolio, the formula also takes into account the elimination of patents from the portfolio, whether due to
expiration, the departure of a Licensor from the joint licensing program, or
the expert's determination that a patent is no longer "essential," and the
addition of new "essential" patents.

(37) Until the first allocation pursuant to the formula is calculated, Toshiba will distribute royalties equally among the Licensors;

(38) thereafter, Toshiba will distribute royalties in accordance with the formula, adjusting distributions so as retroactively to make the total distributions during the initial two-year period conform to the formula.

(39) Each Licensor may retain an independent accountant to audit
Toshiba's licensing activities up to twice a year.

(40)Toshiba will sublicense the Licensors' patents through a single DVD Patent
License, which will convey to licensees a non-exclusive, non-transferable
license under the licensed patents to "make, have made, use, sell, and
otherwise dispose of DVD Products" in exchange for the aforementioned
royalties.

(41) As contemplated in the Authorization Agreement, the DVD Patent License will also release licensees from liability for any infringement of the licensed patents prior to the effective date of the license.

(42) The license will inform the licensee of the specific patents being licensed,

(43)and will state that the licensee may choose instead to license the patents
separately from the individual Licensors on "fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory
terms, whether or not Licensee intends to manufacture and/
or sell DVD Products in conformity with the DVD Standard
Specifications."

(44) A most-favored-nations clause will entitle the licensee to opt for any more favorable royalties that Toshiba agrees to with any other licensee, if the licensee is willing to agree to "any additional benefits http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm (5 of 19) [7/9/2010 6:41:46 AM]

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to Licensor that may be included among the terms and conditions
corresponding to such royalty rates."

(45)The licensee's only grantback obligation covers any "essential" patents it
may own or control during the term of the license. Each licensee agrees to
grant non-exclusive licenses on such patents, on "fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms," to the Licensors, their affiliates, and all other
licensees of the pool.

(46) Disputes between the licensee and any Licensor over what constitutes "fair and reasonable terms and conditions" for the license are subject to arbitration by an expert "jointly appointed and paid" by the parties to the dispute.

(47) The failure to grant such a license to a Licensor, followed by an infringement suit against the Licensor under that "essential" patent, subjects the licensee to termination of the DVD Patent License with respect to that Licensor's "essential" patents.

(48) The DVD Patent License will run until December 31, 2007, and renew
automatically for 5-year terms thereafter unless the licensee provides 60
days' notice of its intent not to renew.

(49) Notwithstanding that, the license will terminate on the expiration of the last of the licensed patents to expire.

(50) Toshiba may terminate the license in the event of the licensee's bankruptcy,

(51) and either party may terminate the license on
30 days' notice for a breach that is not remedied within 30 days after
notice of the breach.

(52) During the term of the license, Toshiba will have the right to have an
independent auditor review the licensee's books "with respect to sales,
other transfers and royalties."

(53) Pursuant to the MOU, Toshiba will erect
internal firewalls to protect competitively sensitive information, such as
sales volume and selling prices of particular DVD Product models, that it
receives from licensees.

(54) Toshiba's internal procedures for protecting the confidentiality of this information will prohibit Toshiba licensing and accounting personnel who receive confidential licensee information from disclosing that information to any unauthorized person, whether or not that person is a Toshiba employee.

(55) Toshiba will implement these procedures in part through confidentiality agreements it will enter into with its licensing and accounting employees who are authorized to receive confidential licensee information.

(56)III. Analysis As with any aggregation of patent rights for the purpose of joint package licensing, commonly known as a patent pool, an antitrust analysis of this
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The potential benefit of a patent pool is that it "may provide competitive benefits by integrating complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation."(57) At the same time, "some patent pools can restrict competition, whether among intellectual property rights within the pool or downstream products incorporating the pooled patents or in innovation among parties to the pool."

(58) Accordingly, the following analysis addresses (1) whether the proposed licensing program here at issue is likely to integrate complementary patent rights and (2), if so, whether the resulting competitive benefits are likely to be outweighed by competitive harm posed by other aspects of the program.

A fundamental premise of the following analysis is that the patents to be licensed are valid. While this is a legitimate presumption with any patent,

(59) "[a] Licensing scheme premised on invalid or expired intellectual
property rights will not withstand antitrust scrutiny."

(60) Unaccompanied by legitimate intellectual property rights, restrictions on licensors or licensees are highly likely to be anticompetitive. None of the information that you have provided us, however, warrants abandonment of the
presumption of validity as to any of the patents to be licensed.

In particular, although Article 4.1 of the DVD Patent License explicitly
disavows any warranty of validity,(61) a final determination of a licensed
patent's invalidity by a competent court will lead to the patent's exclusion
from the DVD Patent License.

(62) This provision should ensure that this pool is unlikely to foist invalid patents upon users of the Standard Specifications. However, should the Department subsequently receive information that undercuts this conclusion, its enforcement intentions as to the proposed arrangement might be very different from those
expressed below.

A. Integration of Complementary Patent Rights

If the Licensors owned patent rights that could be licensed and used in
competition with each other, they might have an economic incentive to
utilize a patent pool to eliminate competition among them. A pool that
served that purpose "would raise serious competitive concerns."

(63) In combining such substitute patents, the pool could serve as a price-fixing
mechanism, ultimately raising the price of products and services that
utilize the pooled patents.

If, on the other hand, the pool were to bring
together complementary patent rights, it could be "an efficient and
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procompetitive method of disseminating those rights to would-be
users."

(64) By reducing what would otherwise be six licensing transactions
to one, the pool would reduce transactions costs for Licensors and
licensees alike. By ensuring that each Licensor's patents will not be
blocked by those of the other five, the pool would enhance the value of all
six Licensors' patents.

One way to ensure that the proposed pool will integrate only
complementary patent rights is to limit the pool to patents that are
essential to compliance with the Standard Specifications. Essential patents
by definition have no substitutes; one needs licenses to each of them in
order to comply with the standard.

At the same time, they are complementary to each other; a license to one essential patent is more valuable if the licensee also has licenses to use other essential patents.

An inclusion criterion broader than "essentiality" carries with it two
anticompetitive risks, both arising from the possibility that the pool might
include patents that are substitutes for one another and not just
complements. Consider, for example, a situation in which there are several
patented methods for placing DVD-ROMs into packaging -- each a useful
complement to DVD-ROM manufacturing technology, but not essential to
the standard. A DVD-ROM maker would need to license only one of them;
they would be substitutes for each other.

Inclusion in the pool of two or more such patents would risk turning the pool into a price-fixing mechanism. Inclusion in the pool of only one of the competing nonessential patents, which the pool would convey along with the essential
patents, could in certain cases unreasonably foreclose the non-included
competing patents from use by manufacturers; because the manufacturers would obtain a license to the one patent with the pool,they might choose not to license any of the competing patents, even if they otherwise would regard the competitive patents as superior. Limiting a pool to essential patents ensures that neither of these concerns will arise; rivalry is foreclosed neither among patents within the pool nor
between patents in the pool and patents outside it.

From the information you have provided us, it appears reasonably likely
that the pool will combine only complementary patents for which there are
no substitutes for the purpose of compliance with the Standard
Specifications.

To be sure, the definition of "essential" contained in the
MOU and the Authorization Agreement introduces some uncertainty.

By asking the expert to identify not only those patents that are literally
essential to compliance with the DVD-ROM and DVD-Video standards, but
also those for which there is no "realistic" alternative, the definition
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introduces a degree of subjectivity into the selection process. Based on
your representations, however, it appears that the expert will interpret
"realistic" to mean economically feasible.

So long as the patent expert applies this criterion scrupulously and independently, it is reasonable to expect that the Portfolio will combine only complementary patent rights, and not limit competition between them and other patent rights for
purposes of the licensed applications.(65) If, however, the expert over time
interprets "realistic" more broadly, so as to include patents for which
economically feasible alternatives exist, there would be serious questions
as to whether the pool might injure competition by including such
substitutes.

(66) The retention of the expert by the Licensors creates some initial concern
about the expert's ability to apply the essentiality criterion entirely
independent of the Licensors. While the Licensors have agreed that the
expert must be free from any substantial business relationship with any
individual Licensor, the Licensors as a group, to which the expert answers,
have an economic incentive to do the opposite of what they have retained
the expert to do -- to combine in the pool their competing DVD-related
patents and to foreclose others' competing patents. Without more, there
would be justifiable skepticism that the expert can be counted on to
undertake a disinterested review of the "essentiality" of the patent rights
put forward.

However, several factors suggest that the expert should be able to identify
"essential" patents independently of the Licensors. First, the Licensors'
Expert Agreement explicitly sets forth the rules governing the expert's
review and provides that the expert's determination of essentiality is
"conclusive and non-appealable."

(67) Second, the bases for which the Licensors may dismiss the expert -- malfeasance and nonfeasance -- should insulate the expert's work from undue pressure. Third, since the expert's compensation will be based directly on time spent evaluating
patents, regardless whether a given patent is designated as "essential,"
the expert's compensation will not be affected by his or her determinations as to essentiality. Finally, the basis on which Toshiba will allocate royalties gives the Licensors an incentive to ensure that the expert does its job. The formula that will determine the royalty allocation is based on how many of each Licensor's "essential" patents are infringed.

Thus,although the formula weights the patent count with other factors, each
Licensor will benefit monetarily from the exclusion of other Licensors'
non-"essential" patents and accordingly has a strong incentive to
encourage the expert to review other Licensors' patents critically, and to
bring to the expert's attention any patents that have ceased to be
"essential." These factors suggest that it is reasonably likely that the expert will
function independently and, consequently, that the portfolio will contain
only complementary patents without foreclosing competition.

In that case,the proposed arrangement would serve the procompetitive purpose of
combining complementary technologies into a package that will be likely
to lower costs to makers of DVD-Video and DVD-ROM discs, players and
decoders. If, however, these factors prove to be insufficient either to
ensure the expert's ability to function independently and objectively or to
ensure that the pool will contain only "essential" patents, the
Department's conclusions as to the proposed arrangement might be very
different.

B. Foreclosure of Competition in Related Markets

As mentioned above, the Licensors are competitors in markets vertically
related to the licensed technology -- not only in "downstream" markets
such as the manufacture of DVD discs and players, but also in the creation
of content that is incorporated in DVD discs. Consequently, the question
arises whether the pool is likely to impede competition in any of those
markets, not only between any Licensor and licensees or other third
parties, but also among the Licensors themselves.

Based on what you have told us, the proposed licensing program does not
appear to have any such anticompetitive potential in the markets in which
the licensed technology will be used. First, the agreed royalty is
sufficiently small relative to the total costs of manufacture that it is
unlikely to enable collusion among sellers of DVD discs, decoders or
players. Second, the proposed program should enhance rather than limit
access to the Licensors' "essential" patents. Because Toshiba, the joint
licensor, must license on a non-discriminatory basis to all interested
parties, it cannot impose disadvantageous terms on competitors, let alone
refuse to license to them altogether.

(68) Third, the extent of Toshiba's access to proprietary licensee information, either through information provided directly to its licensing employees or through audits conducted by independent accountants, is unlikely to afford it anticompetitive access to competitively sensitive proprietary information, such as cost data.

The other Licensors' similarly limited right to an annual audit of Toshiba's conduct as joint licensor should not increase the likelihood of collusion.

Nor does there seem to be any facet of the proposed program that would facilitate collusion or dampen competition among the Licensors in thecreation of content for software.

C. Effect on Innovation

The proposed licensing program would require Licensors and licensees
alike to agree to license to each other not only their present "essential"
patents, but also any ones they obtain in the future.

(69) The procompetitive benefits of such a requirement are clear. It ensures that no
party to the pool will be able to benefit from the pool while blocking other
parties from utilizing the Standard Specifications.

Further, by bringing other "essential" patents into the portfolio, the requirement lowers licensees' costs in assembling the patent rights they need to comply with
the Standard Specifications. And while it is unclear whether any future
"essential" patent will emerge absent an amendment of the Standard Specifications, the requirement as to future patents reduces the possibility that a future patent will block licensees from practicing a technology in which they may already have invested in heavily. Reducing this uncertainty may be a significant benefit to licensees.

The question arises, nevertheless, whether these procompetitive benefits
are likely to be outweighed by significant discouragement of research and
development relating to the Standard Specifications.

(70) Licensors and licensees might have greater incentives to invest in research and
development in the field were they free to refuse to license other users of
the Standard Specifications under any patent that resulted.

Several considerations suggest that the magnitude of any disincentive
resulting from this requirement will not be sufficiently great to outweigh
the requirement's procompetitive benefits. In the first place, the scope of
the requirement is commensurate with that of the license: It covers only
"essential" patents.

The requirement does not prevent Licensors and
licensees from capturing whatever value they create in non-"essential"
technology.

(71) Second, the pool's royalty-allocation formula makes each
Licensor's share of the royalties a function of the number of its patents
that are infringed, and newer patents are weighted more heavily than
older ones; so each Licensor benefits from introducing new "essential"
patents into the pool.

Third, licensees can choose between licensing their own "essential" patents through the pool, pursuant to the same royaltyallocation rules, and licensing them separately, on "fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms," to each Licensor and pool licensee that requests a license. Finally, licensees, and to a lesser extent, Licensors, remain free to capture whatever value such new patents may have
outside the standard.(72) On balance, on the basis of the information
before us, it appears unlikely that the requirement the program will
impose on Licensors and licensees concerning "essential" patents not
already licensed by the pool will be anticompetitive.

In the current circumstances, the proposed term of the license to
December 31, 2007, does not pose significant concerns as to innovation
competition. The DVD Patent License authorizes only a limited field of use
for the licensed technology -- the manufacture and sale of products that
comply with the Standard Specifications -- and does not limit licensees'
other options. Licensees may seek presently unknown methods of
complying with these standards, or they may support altogether different
product standards.

IV. Conclusion
Based on the information and assurances that you have provided us, it
appears that the proposed arrangement is likely to combine
complementary patent rights, thereby lowering the costs of manufacturers
that need access to them in order to produce discs, players and decoders
in conformity with the DVD-Video and DVD-ROM formats. Your assurances
and information indicate that the proposed arrangement is not likely to
impede competition, either in the licensing or development of technology
for use in making DVDs, players, or decoders or for other products that
conform to alternative formats, or in the markets in which DVDs, players
and decoders compete.

For these reasons, the Department is not presently inclined to initiate
antitrust enforcement action against the conduct you have described. This
letter, however, expresses the Department's current enforcement
intention.

In accordance with our normal practices, the Department
reserves the right to bring an enforcement action in the future if the actual
operation of the proposed conduct proves to be anticompetitive in purpose
or effect.

This statement is made in accordance with the Department's Business
Review Procedure,28 C.F.R. § 50.6. Pursuant to its terms, your business review request and this letter will be made publicly available immediately, and any supporting data will be made publicly available within 30 days of the date of this letter, unless you request that part of the material be withheld in accordance with Paragraph 10(c) of the Business Review Procedure.
Sincerely,
Joel I. Klein

JIK/cjk

cc:Stuart Robinowitz, Esq.
Time Warner Inc.
Jeffrey L. Kessler, Esq.
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
Carl W. Schwarz, Esq.
McDermott, Will & Emery

FOOTNOTES

1. DVD Specifications for Read-Only Disc (the "Standard Specifications"),
Part 3: Video Specifications, Version 1.1 (December 1997), § 3.3.1. DVDVideo,
which is described in Part 3 of the Standard Specifications, appears
to be a subunit of the DVD-ROM format.

The DVD-Video specifications state that DVD-Video discs shall comply with Parts 1 and 2 of the Standard Specifications, which describe the disc's physical and file-system characteristics, respectively. Id., § 1.1.

2. Other than Time Warner, each of the Licensors is a leading
manufacturer of consumer electronics equipment, such as DVD players.
Several Licensors produce DVD discs and content for such discs.

3. In addition to the Licensors, the publishers of the DVD-ROM
Specifications are Philips Electronics, N.V., Pioneer Electronic Corp., Sony
Corp., and Thomson Multimedia. While your letter includes information
concerning the process by which these formats were established, you
have not requested, and this letter does not offer, an opinion on any
competitive issues presented by the development of these formats or any
other DVD-related format.

4. A DVD decoder, implemented in computer hardware or software,
receives and decodes transmissions from a DVD-ROM player over a
computer system bus. DVD Patent License, Art. 1.7.
5. You have designated all the documents attached to your letter, except
the DVD Patent License, as confidential.

6. MOU, ¶ 2; Authorization Agreement, §§ 1.3, 1.8.
7. MOU, ¶ 3.
8. Id.

9. MOU, ¶ 4. These commitments do not, however, apply to patents
"related to" the Content Scramble System or "MPEG-2 data compression
patents that may be applicable to DVD Products." Id. We understand
"MPEG-2 data compression patents" to refer to patents that are essential
to compliance with the MPEG-2 standard.

10. MOU, ¶ 8.
11. Id.
12. Expert Agreement, § 2.3.

13. MOU, ¶ 8. The expert's final review of the Licensors' patents is due to
be completed by June 30, 1999.

Although the MOU suggests that the expert will not only "determine which patents are essential"

14. but also "evaluate the patents for the purpose of determining a fair
and equitable allocation of royalties," id., the allocation will be based on a
mechanical application of an agreed formula set forth in the Ground Rules
for Royalty Allocation, discussed below, rather than on a subjective
evaluation by the expert. The Licensors have already retained experts with
regard to U.S. and Japanese patents.

These experts will also review patents granted in countries other than the U.S. and Japan and will designate as "essential" those that contain a claim "substantially the same as, or broader than, that of an essential U.S. or Japanese patent." Ground
Rules for Royalty Allocation, ¶ 5. Because the experts will be performing
the same function, I will refer to them in the singular.

15. MOU, ¶ 4. Although the MOU does not state explicitly that the expert's
determination of essentiality is binding on the Licensors, the Expert
Agreement does. Expert Agreement, § 2.3.

16. MOU, ¶ 8; Expert Agreement, § 2.4.

17. Expert Agreement, § 2.5, as will be adopted as set forth in your letter
to Christopher J. Kelly dated June 4, 1999, 2.
18. MOU, ¶ 4.1, as will be adopted as set forth in your letter of June 4,
1999, 3.

19. Expert Agreement, § 2.3.
20. Expert Agreement, § 3.1.

21. Id. Similarly, when a Licensor challenges the essentiality of a patent in
the DVD Patent License, it will bear the cost of the expert's review of the
patent unless the expert upholds the challenge, in which case the
patentee Licensor will bear the cost. Expert Agreement, § 3.1, as will be
amended as set forth in your letter of June 4, 1999, 2.
22. MOU, ¶ 8.

23. Expert Agreement, § 1.4, as will be amended as set forth in your letter
of June 4, 1999, 2.
24. MOU, ¶¶ 2, 6.
25. Authorization Agreement, § 2.1.
26. Id.
27. Authorization Agreement, § 3.1.

28. Authorization Agreement, § 4.1. In compensation for acting as the
licensing administrator, Toshiba will collect a fee of three percent of the
annual royalties it collects up to $100 million, and two percent of any
royalties above that amount. Authorization Agreement, § 5.1. It will share
these fees with Hitachi, Ltd., which will be Toshiba's licensing agent in
Asia (except for Japan), Australia, and the Middle East, and Matsushita,
which will be its licensing agent in the Western Hemisphere. 3-Party MOU,
attached as Exhibit 6, Arts. 3.1, 7.1.

29. Authorization Agreement, § 2.3.
30. Authorization Agreement, § 3.2.
31. Authorization Agreement, § 3.3.
32. Authorization Agreement, § 5.1.
33. Id.

34. Authorization Agreement, § 4.2. Thus, although the MOU suggests
that the expert will have a dual role, not only to "determine which patents
are essential,"

35. but also to "evaluate the patents for the purpose of determining a fair
and equitable allocation of royalties," the allocation will be based on a
mechanical application of the Ground Rules for Royalty Allocation rather
than on a subjective evaluation by the expert.

36. Ground Rules for Royalty Allocation.

37. MOU, ¶ 8; Authorization Agreement, § 4.2.3.
38. Authorization Agreement, § 4.3.
39. Authorization Agreement, § 4.4.
40. Authorization Agreement, § 4.9.
41. DVD Patent License, Art. 2.1.

42. DVD Patent License, Art. 2.2. This release is not gratuitous; it is in
exchange for a payment based on the royalty rates. DVD Patent License,
Exhibit 3, Art. 2.1.

43. DVD Patent License, Exhibit 2.
44. DVD Patent License, Art. 2.3.
45. DVD Patent License, Art. 6.1. The most-favored-nations clause does
not apply to terms arising from dispute settlements, court orders, and
individual Licensors' independent licenses to third parties. Id.

46. DVD Patent License, Art. 3.1.
47. Id. The license does not indicate who will determine whether or not
the patent in question is in fact "essential" within the meaning of the DVD
Patent License.

48. DVD Patent License, Art. 3.2.
49. DVD Patent License, Art. 5.1.
50. DVD Patent License, Art. 5.2.
51. DVD Patent License, Art. 5.4.

52. DVD Patent License, Art. 5.3.
53. DVD Patent License, Exhibit 3, Art. 2.8.
54. MOU, ¶ 13. The MOU provides further that the Licensors may have
access to information "as to the names of licensees, categories and model
numbers of licensed products, total quantities of sales of such products
and total royalties." Id.

55. Procedures for Protecting the Confidentiality of Information Provided
by DVD Patent Licensing Program Licensees, attached as Exhibit 8, ¶ 4.

56. DVD Licensing Program: Authorized Employee Confidentiality
Agreement, attached as Exhibit 9.

57. Department of Justice-Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property ("IP
Guidelines"), § 5.5.

58. Letter from Joel I. Klein to Gerrard [sic] R. Beeney, Esq., June 26,
1997 ("MPEG-2 Business Review Letter"), 9 (citing IP Guidelines, § 5.5).

59. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (in an action for infringement, "[a] patent shall
be presumed valid"); Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d
1361, 1364 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

60. MPEG-2 Business Review Letter, 9 (citing United States v.
Pilkington plc, 1994 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,842 (D. Ariz. 1994)).

61. DVD Patent License, Art. 4.1.
62. MOU, ¶ 4.1, as will be amended as set forth in your letter of June 4,
1999, 3.

63. MPEG-2 Business Review Letter, 9.

64. Id.
65. Whether any of the licensed patents might be substitutes for each
other in connection with some other application is not an issue here
because the license here will neither authorize nor impede the use of the
licensed patents for any other application.

66. This is not to say that the Department would challenge such an
arrangement without taking into account the possibility that it creates
significant efficiencies. IP Guidelines, § 5.3. Moreover, the availability of
licenses on the Licensors' "essential" patents independently of the pool
might ameliorate some of the potential competitive harm.

67. Expert Agreement, § 2.3.

68. Although the meaning of "reasonable" is open to various
interpretations, each Licensor's commitment to license its "essential"
patents independently of the pool on reasonable, non-discriminatory terms
may further ensure that the proposed program facilitates, rather than
forecloses, access.

69. MOU, Article 1.3; DVD Patent License, Art. 3.1.
70. See IP Guidelines, § 5.6.

71. DVD Patent License, Art. 3.1. Licensees' freedom to exploit their
non-"essential" patents will be meaningful only to the extent that the
determination whether a licensee's patent is "essential" is made
independently of the Licensors and other licensees, who may earnestly
wish to practice a DVD-related patent that, although attractive, is not
essential to the standard.

The documents you have provided do not
indicate who would determine "essentiality" in this instance. If it is to be
the expert, this points up again the need to ensure the expert's
independence.

72. The Licensors have limited their own options somewhat, having
committed to making their "essential" patents available on reasonable,
non-discriminatory terms independently of the pool license, even for
applications that do not comply with the Standard Specifications.

MOU, ¶3. Licensees, in contrast, remain free to decide how best to exploit their
"essential" patents outside of the Standard Specifications. See DVD Patent
License, Art. 3.1; MOU, ¶4.

http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm (19 of 19) [7/9/2010 6:41:46 AM]"

Source:
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm

More on the iviewit Stolen Technology
http://www.iviewit.tv/

Need to Know How to Steal and Invention and Commit Patent Fraud?

Well you Need a USPTO Official appointed by the President who used to work at a Corrupt Patent Firm - Foley and Lardner.

You Need a Corrupt Patent Attorney like Kenneth Rubenstein - MPEG LA Patent Attorney of the Corrupt Proskauer Rose Law Firm.

You Need someone CORRUPT like MPEG LA to pool your technology with other patents so know one knows you invented it.

And well.. Here is More..

Click Here - Patent Theft, Fraud on the US Patent Office, Postal Fraud, Business and Commerce Fraud

Criminals in iViewit Scandal

Chris Wheeler
Brian G. Utley
Raymond Joao
Kenneth Rubenstein
Douglas Boehm
William Dick
Steven Becker
R3D
Gerald Stanley
Crossbow Ventures
Ryan Huiseman
Raymond Hersch

more on the Massive Shareholder Fraud over Iviewit Technologies
at www.DeniedPatent.com and www.Iviewit.TV

Need to Know How to Steal and Invention and Commit Patent Fraud?

Well you Need a USPTO Official appointed by the President who used to work at a Corrupt Patent Firm - Foley and Lardner.

You Need a Corrupt Patent Attorney like Kenneth Rubenstein - MPEG LA Patent Attorney of the Corrupt Proskauer Rose Law Firm.

You Need someone CORRUPT like MPEG LA to pool your technology with other patents so know one knows you invented it.

And well.. Here is More..

Click Here - Patent Theft, Fraud on the US Patent Office, Postal Fraud, Business and Commerce Fraud

Criminals in iViewit Scandal

Chris Wheeler
Brian G. Utley
Raymond Joao
Kenneth Rubenstein
Douglas Boehm
William Dick
Steven Becker
R3D
Gerald Stanley
Crossbow Ventures
Ryan Huiseman
Raymond Hersch

more on the Massive Shareholder Fraud over Iviewit Technologies
at www.DeniedPatent.com and www.Iviewit.TV

Gerald Lewin Corruption Over Iviewit Stolen Technology.

Gerald Lewin is Corrupt. What Judges, Attorney, DOJ officials, SEC Officials Protect the Corruption of Gerald Lewin?

Goldstein & Lewin

Exhibit 26 – Gerald Lewin response to his client starting to use I View It Technologies
Exhibit 3 – Timeline of Incidents and allegations, hints and innuendo’s
Exhibit 29 – How not to create an excel sheet
Exhibit 30 – What happened on the way to Bankruptcy?
Exhibit 27 – Infringers
Exhibit 28 - Endorsements
Exhibit Final
143rd SMPTE Technical Conference and Exhibition
Hilton New York, November 4-7, 2001
Possible Enforcement Remedy

Gerald Lewin Video to Try and Get Hired by Iviewit...
Gerald Lewin Committed Massive FRAUD in the Iviewit Scandal,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xjtW7DyQlqY

GERALD R. LEWIN, CPA - GOLDSTEIN LEWIN & CO;
ERIKA LEWIN, CPA - GOLDSTEIN LEWIN & CO;
JENNIFER LEWIN;
http://iviewit.tv/company/index.htm


More on Iviewit

www.DeniedPatent.com

www.Iviewit.tv

www.JeffreyBewkes.com

www.BruceSewell.com

www.CEOpaulOtellini.com

Proskauer Rose Law Firm involved in Mass Cover Ups of Multi-Trillion Dollar Patent.

"Where once caught stealing the patents, Proskauer Rose has gone through elaborate steps to obstruct justice and deny due process of complaints against them.

Through abuses of public office positions and a series of diabolical conflicts of interests at Supreme Court bar associations and in a civil court in Florida, where initial complaints were filed, including a counter complaint.

The counter complaint was denied to be allowed and in this civil billing case Proskauer Rose won through a default judgment after the judge dismissed two sets of Iviewit counsel and granted Proskauer Rose a victory for Iviewit's failure to retain replacement counsel.

This case will be appealed pending information from the investigations, because as it turns out, Iviewit defended companies it did not own, as Proskauer Rose appears to have sued the companies they fraudulently set up to own the stolen patents.

That once caught stealing the patents, Proskauer Rose made a desperate attempt to rid the shell companies that they had put the Stolen IP into and gain control of the assets through a lawsuit claiming monies owed, while their management referrals tried and involuntary bankruptcy claiming monies owed.

In fact, the company was not even aware that Proskauer Rose and their management had taken such actions.

The company was notified by members of AOLTW/WB while seeking a twenty five million dollar raise that such legal actions were found while doing their due-diligence but the company was never made aware they were even lawsuits or bankruptcy, as these were for companies named similar and identical to the shareholder companies but not owned by the shareholders.

Upon learning of the legal actions and involuntary bankruptcy the company through a friend and hero (and you will learn of many who have helped carry the torch this far through personal sacrifice and risk), Caroline Prochotska Rogers, Esq. fired the counsel we were unaware we had and filed the counter complaint in the civil case and filed in the bankruptcy.

We retained new counsel, Steven Selz, Esq., Greenberg Traurig, and others to begin to peel the onion and file back but Judge Jorge Labarga would not allow us to present our case and through denying due process and procedure threw the case. All prior counsel was fired that had been prior representing the companies without authorization and this new team took over the cases.

At the time, it was not known that two sets of identical companies had been set up and that the companies we were now defending were not owned by the shareholders but by the companies lawyers. Therefore, Iviewit at the time thought that it was representing companies that its shareholders owned.

It was not until the USPTO found that certain patents listed by the attorneys as assets of the Iviewit companies, where not in fact owned or assigned to the parties the attorneys listed on the IP dockets, (USPTO LETTER SHOWING THAT CERTAIN IP ASSETS THOUGHT TO BE IVIEWIT ASSETS ARE OTHERS) that evidence of the multi-layered corporate and patent shell scheme began to surface.

Identically named companies, as illustrated in the Company History section, were formed to transfer stolen IP in the wrong inventors names and with no assignment or ownership to shareholders; fascinating, like a shell game of hide the real patents.

Upon attempting to ascertain why the patents were all wrong in inventors, assignees, owners and content, it was learned that dual named corporations were set up and again the information has been forwarded to state and federal authorities and the company is awaiting the outcome of these investigations.

Federal and international authorities have been notified that the organization MPEGLA LLC and other patent pools now controlled by our former Proskauer patent attorneys are acting as anti-competitive and monopolistic criminal enterprises to further aid in the theft and proliferation of the Iviewit inventions through a tying and bundling scheme.

This scheme denies paying royalties to the Iviewit Shareholders including the SBA.

Why, you may ask, is Proskauer Rose LLP a former real estate firm since the 1800's, suddenly controlling patent pools that directly infringe upon the Iviewit inventions, after Proskauer Rose learned of the inventions directly from the inventors?

In fact, Proskauer Rose attorney Kenneth Rubenstein, a member of the Advisory Board for Iviewit and lead patent counsel to MPEGLA LLC, is now trying to claim that he never heard of Iviewit under deposition (Kenneth Rubenstein Deposition) and sworn statements to a civil court.

Where evidence shows Rubenstein's direct involvement, Kenneth Rubenstein is found to be a BIG FAT LIAR..

Evidence such as his name in the Iviewit billings and letters from executives of AOLTW/WB showing that he opined favorably on the patents to induce investment from them, contradicts his perjured deposition.

Evidence like his name as an Advisory Board Member in a Wachovia Private Placement Memorandum, co-authored, disseminated and billed for by his firm Proskauer Rose and hosts of other evidence clearly showing his knowledge and involvement.

When confronted under deposition with such evidence, Kenneth Rubenstein, Proskauer Rose LLP refused to answer direct deposition questions (at his civil billing case) and left his deposition stating that we would have to have the court order him back to answer questions that directly affect the shareholders.

The court did order him back to the answer the questions but before he could be re-deposed the civil case trial was thwarted by the judge. Iviewit after being released of retained counsel by the judge never got the opportunity.

Kenneth Rubenstein who swears under deposition, under sworn statements to the Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division: First Department Departmental Disciplinary Committee and in a written statement to Judge Jorge Labarga of the civil court in Florida to have never heard of Iviewit, the Iviewit inventions or inventors; cannot be the same Kenneth Rubenstein opining favorably on the Iviewit patents to AOLTW/WB -

(click here for AOLTW/WB letter dusting Rubenstein's statements and exposing him for perjury).

Source and More
http://iviewit.tv/about/index.htm

More on the Iviewit Stolen Patent
and the Massive Shareholder Fraud

www.DeniedPatent.com

www.Iviewit.TV

www.JeffreyBewkes.com

www.CEOpaulOtellini.com

FBI Coverups, Boca Police Scandals, Major Law Firms Covering Corruption, Enron Collapsing, Attempted Murder, Invention Stolen, Denial of Due Process.

Proskauer Rose Corruption

In America only Certain People have rights to Protection from the Law - Most All are just Collateral Damage to Protect Corrupt Attorneys, Judges, DOJ Officials, Corrupt FBI agents, Billionaire Tech Companies, Major Media Companies and Mega Law Firms.

Judical Coverups, Attorneys and Judges Protecting Each Other, Illegal Behavior among judges, attorneys and clerks .. well this is American Justice.. not based in TRUTH or Law but Based in who you know and what your willing to pay them to cover your Dirty Deeds...

"" KernelOfTruth says:

There is a case in which any one of you might be interested. It involves the theft of patents worth at least one trillion dollars, and has already paid out billions in royalties that have never been received by the inventor or the company (with no report of where that much looted money has disappeared).

The reason you may be interested is that it is a Florida case with ties to places in New York, and the inventor seems to have run into problems similar to those discussed by individuals who have posted on the subject of public corruption in the Scott Rothstein case.

The shenanigans are unbelievable, including, but certainly not limited to, a Keystone Cop like investigation by the Boca Raton Police Department and an ostensible Office of the FBI [in West Palm Beach]. How much do you think it cost the taxpayers to set up that [rented FBI] Office, which acted as though an investigation was being run when nothing was done to examine the complicity of lawyers, public officials, and investigating agencies and a car bombing.

If you are interested, you can go to http://www.iviewit.tv and listen to certain testimony relating to the crimes that were allowed to occur through the Courts, both a Civil Division State Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court, in West Palm Beach, Florida.

If you prefer, you can read certain documents at
http://www.iviewit.tv/CompanyDocs/2007%2004%2020%20Iviewit%20Request%20for%20FBI%20IA%20and%20OIG%20investigation%20of%20FBI%20case%20downlow.pdf

The inventor and main person being abused, Eliot L. Bernstein, discusses the matter in the State Hearings held in New York, involving public corruption. One case brought up concerns a Monty Friedkin case, which he says is cloaked as lawyers and law firms acting as a criminal enterprise stealing inventions from inventors.

He identifies William J. Dick of the Foley and Lardner law firm and Brian Utley as working with Christopher Clarke Wheeler to steal inventions from Monte Friedkin, of Diamond Turf Equipment, a Florida corporation.

The criminal enterprise against Mr. Friedkin was explained as Utley (operating as the President of the company) contracting former IBM patent attorney William Dick to write Friedkin’s patents in his name and place them into a company incorporated by Christopher C.Wheeler of Proskauer Rose.

According to [page 15 of] the Complaint found at that web site, a lawyer that had subsequently been convicted in Florida of Felony Driving Under the Influence with Injury is identified as the instigator or ringleader. Then, this ringleader, Christopher Clarke Wheeler, is identified as a lawyer with the law firm of Proskauer Rose.

This scam is identified by Eliot Bernstein (in testimony and also by Stephen Lamont in the Complaint) as being perpetrated in a same fashion [as that run against Diamond Turf] when involving his Iviewit Company, wherein certain individuals performed in the enterprise, to walk the patents and intellectual properties [Utley] worked on, out of the business and into a company that these co-adventurers owned, in which the true owner [in this case, one can replace Friedkin with Bernstein] had no interest or idea of it’s existence.

Scroll down to pages 16 - 18 of the 43 page Complaint, and you can read about how both intrinsic and extrinsic fraud were further perpetrated before a Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, in the State of Florida, with what would appear a Circuit Court Judge’s willingness to grant an allowance for continual acts of perjury, intentional fraud, and criminal acts of conversion.

For instance, the Judge [Jorge Labarga] is said to have stated that the prior counsel that the parties did not know or hire had been representing them so that the right to file almost anything in the case had been waived by the counsel that had no authority to file the case or act in the case.

Further on, at page 21 [after explaining the reasons for starting File number 402-2-59-1799-339, on May 13th, 2002, with the County of Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, at the behest of the Long Beach, California FBI], is the explanation “Bernstein, upon discovering further that the companies were involved in a federal bankruptcy in Florida (Case No. 01-33407-BKC-SHF Inv Chap 11 in the Southern District of Florida) and the law suit in civil court in Proskauer Rose v. Iviewit discussed above, both previously unbeknownst to exist by shareholders or management of the legitimate companies, built his case from California and then moved to Florida to the lions den or Labarga’s court and the Bankruptcy Court, believing that justice would be had.

Both actions filed in Florida were instigated by Proskauer Rose and Proskauer Rose referred management Utley, Michael Reale and an entity RYJO, Inc. (“RYJO”).

RYJO a subcontractor under a strategic alliance structured by Proskauer Rose, between Iviewit and Real 3D, Inc. (“R3D”) a client of theirs, R3D owned 70% by Lockheed Martin, 20% by Silicon Graphics Inc., and 10% by Intel, later wholly acquired by Intel and a third party necessary with management to file an involuntary.

With new counsel relieving dirty counsel, those acting without authority, now replaced by counsel retained by the legitimate companies, Bernstein went back to Florida to pursue his rights. It is presumed that once Proskauer Rose to instantly get rid of the evidence of the fraudulent companies but first had a plan to get the stolen intellectual properties out.


Thus, when combined, the billing case that they thought nobody would ever discover was in court and bankruptcy, the companies could do the following:

(i) Proskauer Rose would sue fraudulent companies ABC which harbored the stolen patents with a large unpaid bill

(ii) this would make them the largest creditor and thus entitled in a bankruptcy to majority of the company and the stolen patents and

(iii) with Utley, RYJO and Reale instigating the bankruptcy they would be the remaining benefactors, it would all look clean to the Courts, almost invisible and they would walk off with the stolen assets. They never figured that Bernstein would be tipped off to this in the midst of the process”.

It was related that one of the counsel [Kenneth Rubenstein] “was so brazen that the Court was in his pocket, that he wrote [Judge] Jorge Labarga a sworn statement claiming he never heard of Eliot Bernstein, the Iviewit companies and was being harassed”.

Also related to the case was a declaration of a showing to Warner Brothers of entries with investor H. Wayne Huizenga, in regards to the Iviewit inventions and multiple billings.

The kicker in the last paragraph [on page 18] is the obvious dereliction of duty in regards to what passes for FBI Agents in the network [of the ol’ south Good Ole Boys] and compromised Office of the US Attorney with the Southern District of Florida, when it is written “one asks, why later those same crimes exposed in mass against the government to the West Palm Beach Office of the FBI, were not prosecuted when taken by the FBI to the US Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, along with all the other crimes they were apprised of and given evidence in support of and which they then led Iviewit to believe they were investigating until April 17, 2007”.

Page 20 holds a critical piece of information, which is “Another part of the immediate problem was that evidence surfaced of a deal between the fraudulent Iviewit companies and Enron’s Broadband Division, in the now infamous Enron/Blockbuster Deal which due to Enron’s booking of hundreds of millions of dollars ahead of earning it, on a new technology for broadband internet distribution of movies, based on technologies almost stolen from Iviewit which are the true cause of the collapse of Enron.

All evidence of this had to be destroyed by the law firms who had perpetrated the crimes and this may have been the cause of the massive shredding party”.

For a story about the “Specific Involvement by the Federal Bureau of Investigation -- West Palm Beach Office: January 2003 to March 2007”, scroll down to page 23.

The tale involves accusations regarding lawyers submitting false statements and falsified documents (including to a Court of Law), money made or laundered under the use of Non-Disclosure Agreements, conflicts of interest and appearances of impropriety that involved Public Office corruption cases before the Florida Supreme Court, denial of due process and procedure in the Civil Courts as the criminal lawyers legal and political power have been able to position [without disclosure] through conflict to avoid prosecution by infiltrating Public Offices where Complaints have been filed, the infiltration of the attorney discipline process [both in New York and Florida],

..the possibility that the [Democrat-controlled] Proskauer Rose law firm is controlling certain of the Florida Courts and Disciplinary Departments when the New York law firm has one small Office in Boca Raton, cases at the Boca Raton Police Department that were derailed [with the Officer disappearing without Notice],

...the possibility that the [Republican-controlled] Foley and Lardner Law Firm is controlling a certain tier of the Florida Courts and the Governor’s Office when the Wisconsin law firm had virtually no presence in Florida, a subterfuge of a deferral of a Department of Business and Professional Regulation Complaint that falls under another conflict due to the fact that Governor Charlie Crist had appointed [Iviewit’s former patent counsel] Foley and Lardner, special Office positions favorably given to lawyers like George Lemieux [a managing shareholder where the ringleader (Christopher Wheeler) worked in the Fort Lauderdale Office of the Gunster, Yoakley, & Stewart law firm].

The behavior of the President of The Florida Bar [Kelly Overstreet Johnson] who worked for the brother [James Wheeler] of the ringleader lawyer, the infiltration of federal investigations, an FBI Agent [Stephen Lucchesi] who acted as though the problem was one that was civil in nature without need for FBI involvement, Special Agent Joseph Sconzo’s denial that there was any file concerning Iviewit in the FBI’s [rented] West Palm Beach Office.

Special Agent in Charge John McVie’s denial of any history of Iviewit or Eliot Bernstein with any FBI investigation after years of investigation, a non-existent Securities and Exchange Commission investigation jointly run with the Boca Raton Police Department, denial of any oversight responsibilities pertaining to action taken by the FBI by the Inspector General of the Department of Justice [Glenn Fine],

.... the dismissal of a need for an audit when the Small Business Administration is the largest investor and shareholder through SBIC loans, the lack of oversight by the US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida, the lack of investigation by the Department of Justice into the Iraqi-style car bombing of the family vehicle belonging to Mr. Bernstein his wife and three children, possible terminations of US Attorneys for political reasons and retirements of Special Agents for political reasons,

... an admittance of no power or authority held by either the House Judiciary Committee or the Senate Judiciary Committee, harm to international relations through violations of international treatises, the failure of former Commissioner of Patents [John Doll] and his successor Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property [Jon W. Dudas] to follow the law, and possible influence wielded by Michael Grebe [the former Chairman of the Foley and Lardner law firm and former Chairman of the Republican National Committee who is currently under investigation for other violations]

The gist of the Complaint can be boiled down to the request contained on page 22, which is “With the revenues from the technologies converted to their pools and already generating profits in billions of dollars since invention, it would take either a continuous corruption of any legal or prosecutorial agency the complaints went or easier that with a Presidential top down denial of due process and procedure, through various Presidential appointments in key positions to block it top down.

We are asking the DOJ OIG to investigate for any possible connection to election fraud or payola to politicians capable of planting individuals to block Iviewit at each of these agencies”.

Moreover, on page 7 of a succeeding formal request to the Office of Internal Affairs for the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the inventor and President & Founder of Iviewit Technologies, Inc./Iviewit [Iviewit Holdings, Inc.], Eliot Bernstein, further concluded his ordeal and exasperation and concern for others, in his summation: “Please contact me immediately regarding these matters, as I fear for not only the life of my family but those who had volunteered to act as witnesses and others, that presumed they were doing so with the FBI investigating the matters.

I am in grave concern that the FBI has taken no actions to protect a citizen whose life has been threatened repeatedly, whose car has been blown up and confirmed as committed with intent by fire investigators.

A group of citizens who have followed all the rules of making complaints to all the proper authorities, to find that no one is protecting their rights to life, as well as, the rights guaranteed through the Constitution under Article I, Sec 8, Clause 8 pertaining to protection of inventors with the full weight of the Constitution, in the event of just such attempts to steal such inventions and murder inventors.

In fact, in a RICO case the FBI typically offers protection to witnesses against corruption from small or large mobsters when witnesses’ lives may be in danger.

Where a group of citizens have brought allegations of corruption that may yield a Patentgate, with attempted murders already occurring in the US and threats already effectuated against ones life, it is stunning that FBI officers who have been fully apprised of the matters and tendered evidence and witnesses against the accused, have not granted an iota of protection to those who are in danger, all indicating a top down control of the government and its regulatory agencies.

Control by those at the top to aid and abet those alleged to have committed such atrocities, through violation of public offices of these federal and state investigatory agencies. Most disturbing though is that it now appears that no one is protecting the United States and foreign nations from a group of criminals cloaked as lawyers, politicians and judicial members!”. ""

Posted Here
By Investigative Blogger
Crystal L. Cox
Crystal@CrystalCox.com

What Really Collapsed Enron? Well it was a Proskauer Rose Law Firm Scandal, a Foiled Patent Theft. Proskauer Rose Law Attorney Corruption has ruined countless lives, portfolios and has left an amazing path of Destruction.

Can Enron Victims Sue Proskauer Rose Law Firm for their Loss, Suffering and Hardship.. well if they had the TRUTH .. maybe? But wait.. Proskauer Rose controls US Courts, Judges, Attorney Ethics Committees .. so Nevermind...

Top Judge Sets Liberal Course for New York - Jonathan Lippman - Judith Kaye - Proskauer Rose LLP - Iviewit Technologies - Connections and Affiliations

"" Gov. David A. Paterson nominated Jonathan Lippman to head the New York Court of Appeals in January 2009, making him the chief judge of the state.

The choice was a gamble: The judge, a longtime court administrator, did not have a long history of deciding cases, and there was almost no record of his political views.

Judge Jonathan Lippman has helped turn the Court of Appeals into a scrappier, more divided and more liberal panel, its rulings and court statistics show.

Now, a year in, the parameters of the Lippman court are coming into focus. He has helped turn the Court of Appeals into a scrappier, more divided and more liberal panel, its rulings and court statistics show.

To get the rulings he wants, the decisions show, the new chief judge has built alliances case by case with each of the four judges who were nominated by the last Republican governor, George E. Pataki, cracking the conservative majority.

The changes to the culture of the court, New York’s highest — which has sometimes been one of the most influential state courts in the country — are especially striking when Chief Judge Lippman’s approach is compared with the judicial style of his predecessor, Judith S. Kaye. She had prized unanimity.

In the past year, the court has issued a series of sharply divided decisions that have been surprising from a judicial body with a clear 4-to-3 conservative majority. They have included decisions favoring criminal defendants and injured workers, expanding environmental challenges and extolling individual rights against the police.

“The message he is sending is he doesn’t mind fighting for a much more progressive direction at the court,” Vincent M. Bonventre, a professor at Albany Law School who studies the court, said of Judge Lippman.

Though fiscal and political problems have plagued Mr. Paterson, a Democrat, Judge Lippman’s nomination may be one of his most enduring accomplishments in shaping policy. Judge Lippman, 64, does not reach mandatory retirement age until 2015.

Noting that the Supreme Court had yet to rule on questions presented by Global Positioning Systems, for example, the Court of Appeals ruled 4 to 3 that the State Constitution barred the police from placing GPS tracking devices on cars without a warrant.

A different Republican judge joined the three Democratic appointees in another divided ruling, this one striking down a youth curfew in Rochester as unconstitutional, though other courts around the country have approved such laws.

The Lippman court has also shifted ground on worker injury suits, saying that in the past the court too rigidly limited some of them. It has also signaled a new interest in arguments from criminal defendants, sharply increasing, at Judge Lippman’s urging, the number of appeals it is considering.
In an interview, Judge Lippman acknowledged that he had a different approach from that of Judge Kaye, a longtime collaborator in running the courts.

She was also nominated by a Democrat, former Gov. Mario M. Cuomo, but during her nearly 16 years as chief judge, she often worked for unified rulings.

“I am a result-oriented person,” Judge Lippman said, “and the result I am looking for is not necessarily unanimity.”

According to the court, unanimous rulings declined from about 82 percent during 2008, Judge Kaye’s final year, to 69 percent in Judge Lippman’s first year.

During Judge Kaye’s tenure, the court became more conservative partly because of the arrival of the four Pataki judges. Professor Bonventre, the Albany Law School expert, said that divided decisions became more common in Judge Kaye’s final years but that dissents increased further after Judge Lippman arrived.

The rulings indicate that on occasion, Judge Lippman has tailored his arguments to attract one of the four Pataki judges.

In a decision he wrote in September, the court waded into politics by overruling two lower courts that had said Mr. Paterson’s appointment of Richard Ravitch as lieutenant governor was unlawful.

That view, Judge Lippman wrote, would “frustrate the work of the executive branch.”
It was an argument that seemed crafted to appeal to Judge Susan P. Read, a staunch conservative but a former top legal adviser to Governor Pataki, who was not shy about exerting executive authority. It was a party-line vote, except that Judge Read broke with the other Pataki appointees.

In the environmental case, Judge Lippman and the other two Democratic appointees aligned with two of the Republican-appointed judges, Victoria A. Graffeo, a onetime Republican legislative lawyer, and Robert S. Smith, who had sometimes expressed libertarian views.
The decision, written by Judge Smith, appeared to involve tradeoffs.

It tartly noted that the suit sought to kill a proposed hotel to protect obscure species, the Eastern spadefoot toad and the worm snake.

The hotel got a green light. But in the process, the case gave environmentalists one of their most important court victories in New York in nearly 20 years. The majority said a 1991 ruling of the court had been too narrowly applied to limit those who could bring such suits to immediate neighbors.

Stephen F. Downs, the lawyer for Save the Pine Bush, the Albany group that brought the suit, said someone on the bench seemed to be paying for an environmental victory with a defeat for the spadefoot toad. “My impression,” Mr. Downs said, “was there was a certain amount of horse trading that went on.”

That would be vintage Lippman, people who know him say. He was a get-things-done administrator, said a retired judge, Betty Weinberg Ellerin, who has known him throughout his 38-year legal career. ""

Source of Post
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/18/nyregion/18lippman.html

New York Court Corruption, Affiliations and Conflicts of Interest. Time for Accountability in the New York Courts. Time Whistleblowers were heard and time Proskauer Rose to be accountable for their actions. The Iviewit Stolen Patent Case has many players, however Proskauer Rose is the Patent Attorney that STOLE the Trillion Dollar Patent and Judge Judith Kaye and Her Connections to Proskauer Rose through her Husband.. Stephen Kaye made a Trillion Dollar Patent Theft such as the Eliot Bernstein and Iviewit Technologies Stolen Patent, seem like a Simple "Standard of Practice"...

Pay Attention Folks as more Unfolds on the Connections, Cronism and Conflicts of Interest of Proskauer Rose LLP - Ex-Judge Judith Kaye, Andrew Cuomo ( whose Father Appointed Judith Kaye) and how this all relates to court corruption in New York...

posted here by Investigative Blogger
Crystal L. Cox
More on the Iviewit Stolen Patent at
www.DeniedPatent.com and www.Iviewit.TV