Iviewit Technologies - Original Conspirators? Letter From JOEL I. KLIEN Department of Justice. MPEG LA - Proskauer Rose Corruption.

Does This Letter Give Us a Clue on WHO who the Original People Conspiring in the Iviewit Patent Stealing and Massive Shareholder Fraud that Followed?

No wonder MPEG LA, Toshiba, Japan - is all over the blogs on Iviewit.. they DONE BAD !!!

"" Response to Hitachi, Ltd.'s, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.'...and Victor Company of Japan, Ltd.'s Request for Business Review Letter

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
JOEL I. KLIEN
Assistant Attorney General
Main Justice Building
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2401 (202) 514-
2401 / (202) 514-6543 (f)
antitrust@justice.usdoj.gov (internet)
http://www.usdoj.gov/
(World Wide
Web)
June 10, 1999
VIA FAX
Carey R. Ramos, Esq.
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10019-6064

Dear Mr. Ramos:

This letter is in response to your request on behalf of Hitachi, Ltd.,
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Corporation,
Time Warner Inc., Toshiba Corporation, and Victor Company of Japan,
Ltd. (collectively, the "Licensors"), for the issuance of a business review
letter pursuant to the Department of Justice's Business Review Procedure,
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Request for Business Review Letter

28 C.F.R. § 50.6. You have requested a statement of the Department of
Justice's antitrust enforcement intentions with respect to a proposed
arrangement pursuant to which Toshiba will assemble and offer a package
license under the Licensors' patents that are "essential," as defined below,
to manufacturing products in compliance with the DVD-ROM and DVDVideo
formats and will distribute royalty income to the other Licensors.

I. The DVD-ROM and DVD-Video Formats
The Standard Specifications for the DVD-ROM and DVD-Video formats
describe the physical and technical parameters for DVDs for read-onlymemory
and video applications, respectively, and "rules, conditions and
mechanisms" for player units for the two formats.(1) In either format, the
DVD has more than seven times the storage capacity of a compact disc; a
single-layer, single-sided DVD, for example, can store 4.7 billion bytes
(4.38 GB) of information including audio, video, text, and data. Employing
compression technology, a DVD-Video disc can hold a 135-minute feature
film on a single side.

The Licensors, along with a number of other producers of consumer
electronics hardware, software, or both,(2) established the Standard
Specifications.(3) These Standard Specifications appear to implicate the
intellectual property rights of numerous firms.

II. The Proposed Arrangement
A memorandum of understanding among the Licensors (the "MOU,"
attached as Exhibit 1 to your letter) sets forth the central terms of the
proposed arrangement, pursuant to which Toshiba will aggregate the
Licensors' "essential" patents and disseminate rights under them to
makers of Digital Versatile Discs (DVDs), DVD players, and DVD decoders

(4) ("DVD Products"), and distribute royalty income to the other Licensors.
The arrangement will be carried out through a group of other agreements,
including:

(1) a license that Toshiba will receive from each other Licensor
to enable Toshiba to license users of the Standard Specifications under
that Licensor's "essential" patents (the "Authorization Agreement,"
attached as Exhibit 3);

(2) Toshiba's sublicense to makers of DVD
Products under the Licensors' patents (the "DVD Patent License," attached
as Exhibit 2);

(3) an agreement among the Licensors concerning the
retention and authority of experts to select and evaluate the patents to be
licensed (the "Expert Agreement," attached as Exhibit 4); and (4) the
"Ground Rules for Royalty Allocation" (attached as Exhibit 7), which set
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forth the formula that will determine how Toshiba will distribute royalties
among the Licensors.

(5)A. The patents to be licensed
In the MOU, the Licensors commit to license each other and third parties
to make, use and sell DVD Products under their present and future
patents that are "essential" to doing so.

(6) The Licensors agree to two separate means of carrying out this obligation. First, they agree to grant Toshiba the right to sublicense third parties under their present and future "essential" patents for these purposes, and Toshiba agrees in turn to sublicense those patents, along with its own such patents, in the DVD
Patent Licenses.

(7) Second, each Licensor agrees to "offer to license its
essential DVD patents on a non-exclusive basis to interested third-party
licensees pursuant to separate negotiations on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory
terms, whether or not said third-party licensees intend to
make, use and sell DVD products that are in conformity with the
Specifications."

(8)A Licensor's patent is "essential," and thus subject to the commitments in
the MOU, if it is "necessarily infringed," or "there is no realistic alternative"
to it, "in implementing the DVD Standard Specifications."

(9) Initially, each
Licensor will identify its own "essential" patents in an attachment to its
Authorization Agreement with Toshiba.

(10) Toshiba will then incorporate
those patents in a list attached to the DVD Patent License.

(11) Shortly,however, an expert individual or panel, with "full and sufficient knowledge and skill in the relevant technology,"

(12) will complete a review the patents each Licensor has designated as "essential" in order to determine whether they satisfy the MOU criteria.

(13).MOU, ¶ 8; Expert Agreement, preamble.

(14) At that time, any patent initially designated by a Licensor for inclusion
in the DVD Patent License that the expert determines is not "essential" will
be excluded from subsequent DVD Patent Licenses, although current
licensees will have the option to retain it in their existing licenses.

(15)The expert will repeat this comprehensive review of all the patents in the
DVD Patent License portfolio every four years.

(16) In between the quadrennial reviews, the proposed program also provides a mechanism by which the expert may review individual patents whose essentiality comes
into question. If a Licensor comes to a good faith conclusion that a
licensed patent is not "essential," and provides a reasonable basis for that
belief, the expert will re-examine the patent.(17) If the expert concludes
that the patent is not "essential," the patent will be excluded from the
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DVD Patent License.

(18)The agreement provides that the expert's determinations are "conclusive
and non-appealable," although the expert must submit a report explaining
any decision that a patent was not "essential."

(19) Compensation will be at the expert's "standard hourly rates."(20) Each Licensor will bear the cost of the expert's review of its patents; the Licensors will share costs attributable to all of them, such as time spent reviewing the DVD Standard
Specifications.(21) The expert, although retained by the Licensors and
selected by a majority vote among them, will not have an economic
affiliation with any individual Licensor.(22) A majority of the Licensors may
remove the expert for failure or inability to perform the duties set forth in
the Expert Agreement "in a professional, competent, reliable or timely
manner."

(23) Although the proposed licensing program currently includes the patents of
only the Licensors, it is open to any owner of an "essential" patent willing
to license on the program's terms and conditions.

(24) B. The joint licensing arrangement In the Authorization Agreement, each Licensor grants Toshiba the nonexclusive right to grant:

(1) sublicenses, "substantially on the terms contained in the form of the DVD Patent License," on its "essential" patents to third parties to "make, have made, use, sell or otherwise dispose of DVD Products";

(25) and (2) releases to the same third parties from liability for pre-license infringement of the licensed patents.

(26)Toshiba assumes the obligation to grant such sublicenses and releases "to
all interested third party licensees,"(27) to collect royalties from licensees,
and to distribute royalty income to other Licensors.

(28) Consistent with the MOU, the Authorization Agreement preserves the
Licensors' right to license their "essential" patents independently for any
application.

(29) While the Licensors agree to provide each other with
notification of "infringement [of the portfolio patents] or other misuse or
unauthorized use" and to cooperate "in taking such steps as may be
reasonably necessary to prevent any such unauthorized uses,"

(30) each Licensor remains "solely responsible" for enforcing its own patent rights
against infringement.

(31) The Authorization Agreement requires Toshiba to charge royalties of $.075
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per DVD Disc and 4% of the net sales price of DVD players and DVD
decoders, with a minimum royalty of $4.00 per player or decoder.(32) It
provides that these royalty levels will remain unchanged by the addition of
any new members to the pool, unless a failure to raise royalties "would
cause a significant problem in maintaining or expanding the licensing
program."

(33)After deducting its licensing-administrator fee, Toshiba will distribute the
remaining royalties among the Licensors pursuant to an agreed allocation
formula set forth in the Ground Rules for Royalty Allocation.

(34).MOU, ¶ 8;Expert Agreement, preamble.

(35) This formula takes into account how often a Licensor's "essential" patents are infringed by either manufacture or sale of licensees' products, the age of the patents, and, in the case of patents "essential" to disc standards, whether the Licensor's patents relate to optional or mandatory features of the standard.

(36) Pursuant to the expert's quadrennial review of the portfolio, the formula also takes into account the elimination of patents from the portfolio, whether due to
expiration, the departure of a Licensor from the joint licensing program, or
the expert's determination that a patent is no longer "essential," and the
addition of new "essential" patents.

(37) Until the first allocation pursuant to the formula is calculated, Toshiba will distribute royalties equally among the Licensors;

(38) thereafter, Toshiba will distribute royalties in accordance with the formula, adjusting distributions so as retroactively to make the total distributions during the initial two-year period conform to the formula.

(39) Each Licensor may retain an independent accountant to audit
Toshiba's licensing activities up to twice a year.

(40)Toshiba will sublicense the Licensors' patents through a single DVD Patent
License, which will convey to licensees a non-exclusive, non-transferable
license under the licensed patents to "make, have made, use, sell, and
otherwise dispose of DVD Products" in exchange for the aforementioned
royalties.

(41) As contemplated in the Authorization Agreement, the DVD Patent License will also release licensees from liability for any infringement of the licensed patents prior to the effective date of the license.

(42) The license will inform the licensee of the specific patents being licensed,

(43)and will state that the licensee may choose instead to license the patents
separately from the individual Licensors on "fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory
terms, whether or not Licensee intends to manufacture and/
or sell DVD Products in conformity with the DVD Standard
Specifications."

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to Licensor that may be included among the terms and conditions
corresponding to such royalty rates."

(45)The licensee's only grantback obligation covers any "essential" patents it
may own or control during the term of the license. Each licensee agrees to
grant non-exclusive licenses on such patents, on "fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms," to the Licensors, their affiliates, and all other
licensees of the pool.

(46) Disputes between the licensee and any Licensor over what constitutes "fair and reasonable terms and conditions" for the license are subject to arbitration by an expert "jointly appointed and paid" by the parties to the dispute.

(47) The failure to grant such a license to a Licensor, followed by an infringement suit against the Licensor under that "essential" patent, subjects the licensee to termination of the DVD Patent License with respect to that Licensor's "essential" patents.

(48) The DVD Patent License will run until December 31, 2007, and renew
automatically for 5-year terms thereafter unless the licensee provides 60
days' notice of its intent not to renew.

(49) Notwithstanding that, the license will terminate on the expiration of the last of the licensed patents to expire.

(50) Toshiba may terminate the license in the event of the licensee's bankruptcy,

(51) and either party may terminate the license on
30 days' notice for a breach that is not remedied within 30 days after
notice of the breach.

(52) During the term of the license, Toshiba will have the right to have an
independent auditor review the licensee's books "with respect to sales,
other transfers and royalties."

(53) Pursuant to the MOU, Toshiba will erect
internal firewalls to protect competitively sensitive information, such as
sales volume and selling prices of particular DVD Product models, that it
receives from licensees.

(54) Toshiba's internal procedures for protecting the confidentiality of this information will prohibit Toshiba licensing and accounting personnel who receive confidential licensee information from disclosing that information to any unauthorized person, whether or not that person is a Toshiba employee.

(55) Toshiba will implement these procedures in part through confidentiality agreements it will enter into with its licensing and accounting employees who are authorized to receive confidential licensee information.

(56)III. Analysis As with any aggregation of patent rights for the purpose of joint package licensing, commonly known as a patent pool, an antitrust analysis of this
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The potential benefit of a patent pool is that it "may provide competitive benefits by integrating complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation."(57) At the same time, "some patent pools can restrict competition, whether among intellectual property rights within the pool or downstream products incorporating the pooled patents or in innovation among parties to the pool."

(58) Accordingly, the following analysis addresses (1) whether the proposed licensing program here at issue is likely to integrate complementary patent rights and (2), if so, whether the resulting competitive benefits are likely to be outweighed by competitive harm posed by other aspects of the program.

A fundamental premise of the following analysis is that the patents to be licensed are valid. While this is a legitimate presumption with any patent,

(59) "[a] Licensing scheme premised on invalid or expired intellectual
property rights will not withstand antitrust scrutiny."

(60) Unaccompanied by legitimate intellectual property rights, restrictions on licensors or licensees are highly likely to be anticompetitive. None of the information that you have provided us, however, warrants abandonment of the
presumption of validity as to any of the patents to be licensed.

In particular, although Article 4.1 of the DVD Patent License explicitly
disavows any warranty of validity,(61) a final determination of a licensed
patent's invalidity by a competent court will lead to the patent's exclusion
from the DVD Patent License.

(62) This provision should ensure that this pool is unlikely to foist invalid patents upon users of the Standard Specifications. However, should the Department subsequently receive information that undercuts this conclusion, its enforcement intentions as to the proposed arrangement might be very different from those
expressed below.

A. Integration of Complementary Patent Rights

If the Licensors owned patent rights that could be licensed and used in
competition with each other, they might have an economic incentive to
utilize a patent pool to eliminate competition among them. A pool that
served that purpose "would raise serious competitive concerns."

(63) In combining such substitute patents, the pool could serve as a price-fixing
mechanism, ultimately raising the price of products and services that
utilize the pooled patents.

If, on the other hand, the pool were to bring
together complementary patent rights, it could be "an efficient and
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procompetitive method of disseminating those rights to would-be
users."

(64) By reducing what would otherwise be six licensing transactions
to one, the pool would reduce transactions costs for Licensors and
licensees alike. By ensuring that each Licensor's patents will not be
blocked by those of the other five, the pool would enhance the value of all
six Licensors' patents.

One way to ensure that the proposed pool will integrate only
complementary patent rights is to limit the pool to patents that are
essential to compliance with the Standard Specifications. Essential patents
by definition have no substitutes; one needs licenses to each of them in
order to comply with the standard.

At the same time, they are complementary to each other; a license to one essential patent is more valuable if the licensee also has licenses to use other essential patents.

An inclusion criterion broader than "essentiality" carries with it two
anticompetitive risks, both arising from the possibility that the pool might
include patents that are substitutes for one another and not just
complements. Consider, for example, a situation in which there are several
patented methods for placing DVD-ROMs into packaging -- each a useful
complement to DVD-ROM manufacturing technology, but not essential to
the standard. A DVD-ROM maker would need to license only one of them;
they would be substitutes for each other.

Inclusion in the pool of two or more such patents would risk turning the pool into a price-fixing mechanism. Inclusion in the pool of only one of the competing nonessential patents, which the pool would convey along with the essential
patents, could in certain cases unreasonably foreclose the non-included
competing patents from use by manufacturers; because the manufacturers would obtain a license to the one patent with the pool,they might choose not to license any of the competing patents, even if they otherwise would regard the competitive patents as superior. Limiting a pool to essential patents ensures that neither of these concerns will arise; rivalry is foreclosed neither among patents within the pool nor
between patents in the pool and patents outside it.

From the information you have provided us, it appears reasonably likely
that the pool will combine only complementary patents for which there are
no substitutes for the purpose of compliance with the Standard
Specifications.

To be sure, the definition of "essential" contained in the
MOU and the Authorization Agreement introduces some uncertainty.

By asking the expert to identify not only those patents that are literally
essential to compliance with the DVD-ROM and DVD-Video standards, but
also those for which there is no "realistic" alternative, the definition
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introduces a degree of subjectivity into the selection process. Based on
your representations, however, it appears that the expert will interpret
"realistic" to mean economically feasible.

So long as the patent expert applies this criterion scrupulously and independently, it is reasonable to expect that the Portfolio will combine only complementary patent rights, and not limit competition between them and other patent rights for
purposes of the licensed applications.(65) If, however, the expert over time
interprets "realistic" more broadly, so as to include patents for which
economically feasible alternatives exist, there would be serious questions
as to whether the pool might injure competition by including such
substitutes.

(66) The retention of the expert by the Licensors creates some initial concern
about the expert's ability to apply the essentiality criterion entirely
independent of the Licensors. While the Licensors have agreed that the
expert must be free from any substantial business relationship with any
individual Licensor, the Licensors as a group, to which the expert answers,
have an economic incentive to do the opposite of what they have retained
the expert to do -- to combine in the pool their competing DVD-related
patents and to foreclose others' competing patents. Without more, there
would be justifiable skepticism that the expert can be counted on to
undertake a disinterested review of the "essentiality" of the patent rights
put forward.

However, several factors suggest that the expert should be able to identify
"essential" patents independently of the Licensors. First, the Licensors'
Expert Agreement explicitly sets forth the rules governing the expert's
review and provides that the expert's determination of essentiality is
"conclusive and non-appealable."

(67) Second, the bases for which the Licensors may dismiss the expert -- malfeasance and nonfeasance -- should insulate the expert's work from undue pressure. Third, since the expert's compensation will be based directly on time spent evaluating
patents, regardless whether a given patent is designated as "essential,"
the expert's compensation will not be affected by his or her determinations as to essentiality. Finally, the basis on which Toshiba will allocate royalties gives the Licensors an incentive to ensure that the expert does its job. The formula that will determine the royalty allocation is based on how many of each Licensor's "essential" patents are infringed.

Thus,although the formula weights the patent count with other factors, each
Licensor will benefit monetarily from the exclusion of other Licensors'
non-"essential" patents and accordingly has a strong incentive to
encourage the expert to review other Licensors' patents critically, and to
bring to the expert's attention any patents that have ceased to be
"essential." These factors suggest that it is reasonably likely that the expert will
function independently and, consequently, that the portfolio will contain
only complementary patents without foreclosing competition.

In that case,the proposed arrangement would serve the procompetitive purpose of
combining complementary technologies into a package that will be likely
to lower costs to makers of DVD-Video and DVD-ROM discs, players and
decoders. If, however, these factors prove to be insufficient either to
ensure the expert's ability to function independently and objectively or to
ensure that the pool will contain only "essential" patents, the
Department's conclusions as to the proposed arrangement might be very
different.

B. Foreclosure of Competition in Related Markets

As mentioned above, the Licensors are competitors in markets vertically
related to the licensed technology -- not only in "downstream" markets
such as the manufacture of DVD discs and players, but also in the creation
of content that is incorporated in DVD discs. Consequently, the question
arises whether the pool is likely to impede competition in any of those
markets, not only between any Licensor and licensees or other third
parties, but also among the Licensors themselves.

Based on what you have told us, the proposed licensing program does not
appear to have any such anticompetitive potential in the markets in which
the licensed technology will be used. First, the agreed royalty is
sufficiently small relative to the total costs of manufacture that it is
unlikely to enable collusion among sellers of DVD discs, decoders or
players. Second, the proposed program should enhance rather than limit
access to the Licensors' "essential" patents. Because Toshiba, the joint
licensor, must license on a non-discriminatory basis to all interested
parties, it cannot impose disadvantageous terms on competitors, let alone
refuse to license to them altogether.

(68) Third, the extent of Toshiba's access to proprietary licensee information, either through information provided directly to its licensing employees or through audits conducted by independent accountants, is unlikely to afford it anticompetitive access to competitively sensitive proprietary information, such as cost data.

The other Licensors' similarly limited right to an annual audit of Toshiba's conduct as joint licensor should not increase the likelihood of collusion.

Nor does there seem to be any facet of the proposed program that would facilitate collusion or dampen competition among the Licensors in thecreation of content for software.

C. Effect on Innovation

The proposed licensing program would require Licensors and licensees
alike to agree to license to each other not only their present "essential"
patents, but also any ones they obtain in the future.

(69) The procompetitive benefits of such a requirement are clear. It ensures that no
party to the pool will be able to benefit from the pool while blocking other
parties from utilizing the Standard Specifications.

Further, by bringing other "essential" patents into the portfolio, the requirement lowers licensees' costs in assembling the patent rights they need to comply with
the Standard Specifications. And while it is unclear whether any future
"essential" patent will emerge absent an amendment of the Standard Specifications, the requirement as to future patents reduces the possibility that a future patent will block licensees from practicing a technology in which they may already have invested in heavily. Reducing this uncertainty may be a significant benefit to licensees.

The question arises, nevertheless, whether these procompetitive benefits
are likely to be outweighed by significant discouragement of research and
development relating to the Standard Specifications.

(70) Licensors and licensees might have greater incentives to invest in research and
development in the field were they free to refuse to license other users of
the Standard Specifications under any patent that resulted.

Several considerations suggest that the magnitude of any disincentive
resulting from this requirement will not be sufficiently great to outweigh
the requirement's procompetitive benefits. In the first place, the scope of
the requirement is commensurate with that of the license: It covers only
"essential" patents.

The requirement does not prevent Licensors and
licensees from capturing whatever value they create in non-"essential"
technology.

(71) Second, the pool's royalty-allocation formula makes each
Licensor's share of the royalties a function of the number of its patents
that are infringed, and newer patents are weighted more heavily than
older ones; so each Licensor benefits from introducing new "essential"
patents into the pool.

Third, licensees can choose between licensing their own "essential" patents through the pool, pursuant to the same royaltyallocation rules, and licensing them separately, on "fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms," to each Licensor and pool licensee that requests a license. Finally, licensees, and to a lesser extent, Licensors, remain free to capture whatever value such new patents may have
outside the standard.(72) On balance, on the basis of the information
before us, it appears unlikely that the requirement the program will
impose on Licensors and licensees concerning "essential" patents not
already licensed by the pool will be anticompetitive.

In the current circumstances, the proposed term of the license to
December 31, 2007, does not pose significant concerns as to innovation
competition. The DVD Patent License authorizes only a limited field of use
for the licensed technology -- the manufacture and sale of products that
comply with the Standard Specifications -- and does not limit licensees'
other options. Licensees may seek presently unknown methods of
complying with these standards, or they may support altogether different
product standards.

IV. Conclusion
Based on the information and assurances that you have provided us, it
appears that the proposed arrangement is likely to combine
complementary patent rights, thereby lowering the costs of manufacturers
that need access to them in order to produce discs, players and decoders
in conformity with the DVD-Video and DVD-ROM formats. Your assurances
and information indicate that the proposed arrangement is not likely to
impede competition, either in the licensing or development of technology
for use in making DVDs, players, or decoders or for other products that
conform to alternative formats, or in the markets in which DVDs, players
and decoders compete.

For these reasons, the Department is not presently inclined to initiate
antitrust enforcement action against the conduct you have described. This
letter, however, expresses the Department's current enforcement
intention.

In accordance with our normal practices, the Department
reserves the right to bring an enforcement action in the future if the actual
operation of the proposed conduct proves to be anticompetitive in purpose
or effect.

This statement is made in accordance with the Department's Business
Review Procedure,28 C.F.R. § 50.6. Pursuant to its terms, your business review request and this letter will be made publicly available immediately, and any supporting data will be made publicly available within 30 days of the date of this letter, unless you request that part of the material be withheld in accordance with Paragraph 10(c) of the Business Review Procedure.
Sincerely,
Joel I. Klein

JIK/cjk

cc:Stuart Robinowitz, Esq.
Time Warner Inc.
Jeffrey L. Kessler, Esq.
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
Carl W. Schwarz, Esq.
McDermott, Will & Emery

FOOTNOTES

1. DVD Specifications for Read-Only Disc (the "Standard Specifications"),
Part 3: Video Specifications, Version 1.1 (December 1997), § 3.3.1. DVDVideo,
which is described in Part 3 of the Standard Specifications, appears
to be a subunit of the DVD-ROM format.

The DVD-Video specifications state that DVD-Video discs shall comply with Parts 1 and 2 of the Standard Specifications, which describe the disc's physical and file-system characteristics, respectively. Id., § 1.1.

2. Other than Time Warner, each of the Licensors is a leading
manufacturer of consumer electronics equipment, such as DVD players.
Several Licensors produce DVD discs and content for such discs.

3. In addition to the Licensors, the publishers of the DVD-ROM
Specifications are Philips Electronics, N.V., Pioneer Electronic Corp., Sony
Corp., and Thomson Multimedia. While your letter includes information
concerning the process by which these formats were established, you
have not requested, and this letter does not offer, an opinion on any
competitive issues presented by the development of these formats or any
other DVD-related format.

4. A DVD decoder, implemented in computer hardware or software,
receives and decodes transmissions from a DVD-ROM player over a
computer system bus. DVD Patent License, Art. 1.7.
5. You have designated all the documents attached to your letter, except
the DVD Patent License, as confidential.

6. MOU, ¶ 2; Authorization Agreement, §§ 1.3, 1.8.
7. MOU, ¶ 3.
8. Id.

9. MOU, ¶ 4. These commitments do not, however, apply to patents
"related to" the Content Scramble System or "MPEG-2 data compression
patents that may be applicable to DVD Products." Id. We understand
"MPEG-2 data compression patents" to refer to patents that are essential
to compliance with the MPEG-2 standard.

10. MOU, ¶ 8.
11. Id.
12. Expert Agreement, § 2.3.

13. MOU, ¶ 8. The expert's final review of the Licensors' patents is due to
be completed by June 30, 1999.

Although the MOU suggests that the expert will not only "determine which patents are essential"

14. but also "evaluate the patents for the purpose of determining a fair
and equitable allocation of royalties," id., the allocation will be based on a
mechanical application of an agreed formula set forth in the Ground Rules
for Royalty Allocation, discussed below, rather than on a subjective
evaluation by the expert. The Licensors have already retained experts with
regard to U.S. and Japanese patents.

These experts will also review patents granted in countries other than the U.S. and Japan and will designate as "essential" those that contain a claim "substantially the same as, or broader than, that of an essential U.S. or Japanese patent." Ground
Rules for Royalty Allocation, ¶ 5. Because the experts will be performing
the same function, I will refer to them in the singular.

15. MOU, ¶ 4. Although the MOU does not state explicitly that the expert's
determination of essentiality is binding on the Licensors, the Expert
Agreement does. Expert Agreement, § 2.3.

16. MOU, ¶ 8; Expert Agreement, § 2.4.

17. Expert Agreement, § 2.5, as will be adopted as set forth in your letter
to Christopher J. Kelly dated June 4, 1999, 2.
18. MOU, ¶ 4.1, as will be adopted as set forth in your letter of June 4,
1999, 3.

19. Expert Agreement, § 2.3.
20. Expert Agreement, § 3.1.

21. Id. Similarly, when a Licensor challenges the essentiality of a patent in
the DVD Patent License, it will bear the cost of the expert's review of the
patent unless the expert upholds the challenge, in which case the
patentee Licensor will bear the cost. Expert Agreement, § 3.1, as will be
amended as set forth in your letter of June 4, 1999, 2.
22. MOU, ¶ 8.

23. Expert Agreement, § 1.4, as will be amended as set forth in your letter
of June 4, 1999, 2.
24. MOU, ¶¶ 2, 6.
25. Authorization Agreement, § 2.1.
26. Id.
27. Authorization Agreement, § 3.1.

28. Authorization Agreement, § 4.1. In compensation for acting as the
licensing administrator, Toshiba will collect a fee of three percent of the
annual royalties it collects up to $100 million, and two percent of any
royalties above that amount. Authorization Agreement, § 5.1. It will share
these fees with Hitachi, Ltd., which will be Toshiba's licensing agent in
Asia (except for Japan), Australia, and the Middle East, and Matsushita,
which will be its licensing agent in the Western Hemisphere. 3-Party MOU,
attached as Exhibit 6, Arts. 3.1, 7.1.

29. Authorization Agreement, § 2.3.
30. Authorization Agreement, § 3.2.
31. Authorization Agreement, § 3.3.
32. Authorization Agreement, § 5.1.
33. Id.

34. Authorization Agreement, § 4.2. Thus, although the MOU suggests
that the expert will have a dual role, not only to "determine which patents
are essential,"

35. but also to "evaluate the patents for the purpose of determining a fair
and equitable allocation of royalties," the allocation will be based on a
mechanical application of the Ground Rules for Royalty Allocation rather
than on a subjective evaluation by the expert.

36. Ground Rules for Royalty Allocation.

37. MOU, ¶ 8; Authorization Agreement, § 4.2.3.
38. Authorization Agreement, § 4.3.
39. Authorization Agreement, § 4.4.
40. Authorization Agreement, § 4.9.
41. DVD Patent License, Art. 2.1.

42. DVD Patent License, Art. 2.2. This release is not gratuitous; it is in
exchange for a payment based on the royalty rates. DVD Patent License,
Exhibit 3, Art. 2.1.

43. DVD Patent License, Exhibit 2.
44. DVD Patent License, Art. 2.3.
45. DVD Patent License, Art. 6.1. The most-favored-nations clause does
not apply to terms arising from dispute settlements, court orders, and
individual Licensors' independent licenses to third parties. Id.

46. DVD Patent License, Art. 3.1.
47. Id. The license does not indicate who will determine whether or not
the patent in question is in fact "essential" within the meaning of the DVD
Patent License.

48. DVD Patent License, Art. 3.2.
49. DVD Patent License, Art. 5.1.
50. DVD Patent License, Art. 5.2.
51. DVD Patent License, Art. 5.4.

52. DVD Patent License, Art. 5.3.
53. DVD Patent License, Exhibit 3, Art. 2.8.
54. MOU, ¶ 13. The MOU provides further that the Licensors may have
access to information "as to the names of licensees, categories and model
numbers of licensed products, total quantities of sales of such products
and total royalties." Id.

55. Procedures for Protecting the Confidentiality of Information Provided
by DVD Patent Licensing Program Licensees, attached as Exhibit 8, ¶ 4.

56. DVD Licensing Program: Authorized Employee Confidentiality
Agreement, attached as Exhibit 9.

57. Department of Justice-Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property ("IP
Guidelines"), § 5.5.

58. Letter from Joel I. Klein to Gerrard [sic] R. Beeney, Esq., June 26,
1997 ("MPEG-2 Business Review Letter"), 9 (citing IP Guidelines, § 5.5).

59. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (in an action for infringement, "[a] patent shall
be presumed valid"); Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d
1361, 1364 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

60. MPEG-2 Business Review Letter, 9 (citing United States v.
Pilkington plc, 1994 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,842 (D. Ariz. 1994)).

61. DVD Patent License, Art. 4.1.
62. MOU, ¶ 4.1, as will be amended as set forth in your letter of June 4,
1999, 3.

63. MPEG-2 Business Review Letter, 9.

64. Id.
65. Whether any of the licensed patents might be substitutes for each
other in connection with some other application is not an issue here
because the license here will neither authorize nor impede the use of the
licensed patents for any other application.

66. This is not to say that the Department would challenge such an
arrangement without taking into account the possibility that it creates
significant efficiencies. IP Guidelines, § 5.3. Moreover, the availability of
licenses on the Licensors' "essential" patents independently of the pool
might ameliorate some of the potential competitive harm.

67. Expert Agreement, § 2.3.

68. Although the meaning of "reasonable" is open to various
interpretations, each Licensor's commitment to license its "essential"
patents independently of the pool on reasonable, non-discriminatory terms
may further ensure that the proposed program facilitates, rather than
forecloses, access.

69. MOU, Article 1.3; DVD Patent License, Art. 3.1.
70. See IP Guidelines, § 5.6.

71. DVD Patent License, Art. 3.1. Licensees' freedom to exploit their
non-"essential" patents will be meaningful only to the extent that the
determination whether a licensee's patent is "essential" is made
independently of the Licensors and other licensees, who may earnestly
wish to practice a DVD-related patent that, although attractive, is not
essential to the standard.

The documents you have provided do not
indicate who would determine "essentiality" in this instance. If it is to be
the expert, this points up again the need to ensure the expert's
independence.

72. The Licensors have limited their own options somewhat, having
committed to making their "essential" patents available on reasonable,
non-discriminatory terms independently of the pool license, even for
applications that do not comply with the Standard Specifications.

MOU, ¶3. Licensees, in contrast, remain free to decide how best to exploit their
"essential" patents outside of the Standard Specifications. See DVD Patent
License, Art. 3.1; MOU, ¶4.

http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm (19 of 19) [7/9/2010 6:41:46 AM]"

Source:
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm

More on the iviewit Stolen Technology
http://www.iviewit.tv/

Proskauer Rose - Kenneth Rubenstein - MPEG LA, Proskauer Faxes

Tons of Proof against the Corrupt Law Firm Proskauer Rose and Still NO Justice or Invention Rights for the Iviewit Company. MPEG LA makes Billions a Year and the USPTO Denies a Patent to the Rightful Inventors.

"Proskauer Rose Faxes in this folder
Fax 1
Fax 2
Fax 3
Raymond Hand Notes
We now move to another folder of Joao folly and a whole new scheme of documents unfolds in this folder of nonsense.
Fax 1
Fax 2
Fax 3
Fax 4
Fax 5
Fax 6
Fax 7
Fax 8
Fax 9
Fax 10
Fax 11
Email 1
Exhibit 25 – Kenneth Rubenstein "

Source and Lots More
http://iviewit.tv/CompanyDocs/patentforfraud.htm

www.ProskauerSucks.com

Proskauer Rose Law Firm involved in Mass Cover Ups of Multi-Trillion Dollar Patent.

"Where once caught stealing the patents, Proskauer Rose has gone through elaborate steps to obstruct justice and deny due process of complaints against them.

Through abuses of public office positions and a series of diabolical conflicts of interests at Supreme Court bar associations and in a civil court in Florida, where initial complaints were filed, including a counter complaint.

The counter complaint was denied to be allowed and in this civil billing case Proskauer Rose won through a default judgment after the judge dismissed two sets of Iviewit counsel and granted Proskauer Rose a victory for Iviewit's failure to retain replacement counsel.

This case will be appealed pending information from the investigations, because as it turns out, Iviewit defended companies it did not own, as Proskauer Rose appears to have sued the companies they fraudulently set up to own the stolen patents.

That once caught stealing the patents, Proskauer Rose made a desperate attempt to rid the shell companies that they had put the Stolen IP into and gain control of the assets through a lawsuit claiming monies owed, while their management referrals tried and involuntary bankruptcy claiming monies owed.

In fact, the company was not even aware that Proskauer Rose and their management had taken such actions.

The company was notified by members of AOLTW/WB while seeking a twenty five million dollar raise that such legal actions were found while doing their due-diligence but the company was never made aware they were even lawsuits or bankruptcy, as these were for companies named similar and identical to the shareholder companies but not owned by the shareholders.

Upon learning of the legal actions and involuntary bankruptcy the company through a friend and hero (and you will learn of many who have helped carry the torch this far through personal sacrifice and risk), Caroline Prochotska Rogers, Esq. fired the counsel we were unaware we had and filed the counter complaint in the civil case and filed in the bankruptcy.

We retained new counsel, Steven Selz, Esq., Greenberg Traurig, and others to begin to peel the onion and file back but Judge Jorge Labarga would not allow us to present our case and through denying due process and procedure threw the case. All prior counsel was fired that had been prior representing the companies without authorization and this new team took over the cases.

At the time, it was not known that two sets of identical companies had been set up and that the companies we were now defending were not owned by the shareholders but by the companies lawyers. Therefore, Iviewit at the time thought that it was representing companies that its shareholders owned.

It was not until the USPTO found that certain patents listed by the attorneys as assets of the Iviewit companies, where not in fact owned or assigned to the parties the attorneys listed on the IP dockets, (USPTO LETTER SHOWING THAT CERTAIN IP ASSETS THOUGHT TO BE IVIEWIT ASSETS ARE OTHERS) that evidence of the multi-layered corporate and patent shell scheme began to surface.

Identically named companies, as illustrated in the Company History section, were formed to transfer stolen IP in the wrong inventors names and with no assignment or ownership to shareholders; fascinating, like a shell game of hide the real patents.

Upon attempting to ascertain why the patents were all wrong in inventors, assignees, owners and content, it was learned that dual named corporations were set up and again the information has been forwarded to state and federal authorities and the company is awaiting the outcome of these investigations.

Federal and international authorities have been notified that the organization MPEGLA LLC and other patent pools now controlled by our former Proskauer patent attorneys are acting as anti-competitive and monopolistic criminal enterprises to further aid in the theft and proliferation of the Iviewit inventions through a tying and bundling scheme.

This scheme denies paying royalties to the Iviewit Shareholders including the SBA.

Why, you may ask, is Proskauer Rose LLP a former real estate firm since the 1800's, suddenly controlling patent pools that directly infringe upon the Iviewit inventions, after Proskauer Rose learned of the inventions directly from the inventors?

In fact, Proskauer Rose attorney Kenneth Rubenstein, a member of the Advisory Board for Iviewit and lead patent counsel to MPEGLA LLC, is now trying to claim that he never heard of Iviewit under deposition (Kenneth Rubenstein Deposition) and sworn statements to a civil court.

Where evidence shows Rubenstein's direct involvement, Kenneth Rubenstein is found to be a BIG FAT LIAR..

Evidence such as his name in the Iviewit billings and letters from executives of AOLTW/WB showing that he opined favorably on the patents to induce investment from them, contradicts his perjured deposition.

Evidence like his name as an Advisory Board Member in a Wachovia Private Placement Memorandum, co-authored, disseminated and billed for by his firm Proskauer Rose and hosts of other evidence clearly showing his knowledge and involvement.

When confronted under deposition with such evidence, Kenneth Rubenstein, Proskauer Rose LLP refused to answer direct deposition questions (at his civil billing case) and left his deposition stating that we would have to have the court order him back to answer questions that directly affect the shareholders.

The court did order him back to the answer the questions but before he could be re-deposed the civil case trial was thwarted by the judge. Iviewit after being released of retained counsel by the judge never got the opportunity.

Kenneth Rubenstein who swears under deposition, under sworn statements to the Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division: First Department Departmental Disciplinary Committee and in a written statement to Judge Jorge Labarga of the civil court in Florida to have never heard of Iviewit, the Iviewit inventions or inventors; cannot be the same Kenneth Rubenstein opining favorably on the Iviewit patents to AOLTW/WB -

(click here for AOLTW/WB letter dusting Rubenstein's statements and exposing him for perjury).

Source and More
http://iviewit.tv/about/index.htm

More on the Iviewit Stolen Patent
and the Massive Shareholder Fraud

www.DeniedPatent.com

www.Iviewit.TV

www.JeffreyBewkes.com

www.CEOpaulOtellini.com

Kenneth Rubenstein, Corrupt Proskauer Rose Patent Attorney for MPEG LA - Involves Attorney Raymond Anthony Joao.

Kenneth Rubenstein 's lackey, attorney Raymond Anthony Joao, who was a patent attorney working DIRECTLY under Proskauer Rose Attorney Kenneth Rubenstein 's direction.

Raymond Joao now claims 90 patents in his own name and Iviewit gives him kudos as the greatest slime ball inventor and patent attorney.

No really, Iviewit considers our former counselors Raymond Joao and Kenneth Rubenstein to be nothing more than co-inventors of a system and method to defraud shareholders and inventors of their inventions and commit fraud upon worldwide patent intellectual property organizations, an invention that should carry some stiff federal sentences.

Click here for a press article on the amazing inventiveness of Joao

Raymond Joao was so non-inventive that many of these patents resemble ideas and concepts lifted straight from the Iviewit business plan and invention disclosures and ideas that he was supposed to be patenting for the inventors and shareholders.

More on Raymond Joao Click Here

Source of Above and LOTS More
http://iviewit.tv/about/index.htm


More on Iviewit Massive Shareholder Fraud

www.JeffreyBewkes.com

www.CEOpaulOtellini.com

www.BruceSewell.com

www.iviewit.TV

www.DeniedPatent.com

posthed here by
Investigative Blogger
Crystal L. Cox
Crystal@CrystalCox.com

Kenneth Rubenstein Corrupt Patent Attorney at Proskauer Rose Law Firm CONSPIRES with MPEG LA to Commit Massive Fraud and Anti-Trust Violations

MPEG-LA hit by antitrust suit over video codecs. Kenneth Rubenstein Corrupt Patent Attorney Proskauer Rose DOES it Again...

MPEG LA has been in the Illegal - Unethical
Patent Pooling Business for Years.

Proskauer Rose Law Firm has made a Living and Lifetime Business of Billion Dollar Corruption Schemes and screwing over investors. And Well Proskauer Rose's Patent Department has a Billion Dollar Patent Pooling Scheme going on with the help of Corrupt Proskauer Rose Patent Attorney Kenneth Rubenstein and the Illegal, Secret Patent Pool technology Stealing Schemes of MPEG LA.

Corrupt Law Firm ... Proskauer Rose Corrupt Law Firm...

MPEG-LA hit by antitrust suit over video codecs - MPEG LA is Corrupt, it is my understand that MPEG LA Stole a Trillion Dollar Patent with the Aid of Corrupt Law Firms, Tech Companies, Patent Attorneys and Executives

"MPEG-LA hit by antitrust suit over video codecs

German software maker Nero has filed an antitrust complaint against MPEG-LA, the company that oversees licensing for the H.264 video codec favoured by Microsoft and Apple.

MPEG-LA (MPEG Licensing Authority) controls the licenses for the pools of patents needed to use the MPEG-2, MPEG-4 and AVC/H.264 video standards.

As such, it collects royalties from the sale or distribution of almost every PC, DVD, DVD player, digital TV set, TV set-top box, still camera, video camera, iPhone and BlackBerry in the world.

Nero, best known for its CD burning software, alleges that MPEG-LA abuses its monopoly power in these technology markets.

The company filed its antitrust complaint in California district court in Los Angeles on 14 May, seeking unspecified monetary damages and an injunction to halt the alleged anti-competitive actions.

"Absolute power has corrupted MPEG-LA absolutely,"

Nero maintained in its complaint.

"Once MPEG-LA obtained monopoly power in the relevant technology markets, it used that power to wilfully maintain or extend its monopolies for years beyond their natural expiration... and administer its licences in an unfair, unreasonable, and discriminatory manner that stifles competition and innovation, and harms consumers."

MPEG-LA charges licensees different amounts for the same MPEG-2 patent, collects administration fees and royalties multiple times for the same device, and does not communicate its policies adequately to certain licensees, according to Nero.

"By remaining silent on vital aspects of its licensing programs, MPEG-LA has created a system that favours some licensees, such as insiders (ie, licensors), and disfavours others, such as outsiders (ie, non-licensor licensees)," Nero's complaint read.

"As a result, outsiders such as Nero have great difficulty planning technology changes and embarking on programmes to research, develop and implement technological innovations — and are charged supracompetitive royalties on distributions as to which they never agreed to pay royalties — while other licensees, such as insiders, do not face such problems."

According to Nero's complaint, MPEG-LA only obtained monopoly power in the relevant audio and video codec markets after getting assurances in 1997 that the Department of Justice (DoJ) would not launch antitrust proceedings against it.

These assurances were conditional on patent pools not being used to stifle competition, Nero stated. It added that MPEG-LA suggested to the DoJ at the time that the pool for MPEG-2 contained no more than 53 essential patents.

MPEG-LA subsequently added around 800 patents it deemed to be essential to the MPEG-2 pool, so as to extend the duration of the codec's licence, Nero said.

The company did the same thing with the MPEG-4 pool, which now includes more than 1,000 patents, and the AVC/H.264 pool, now with over 1,300 patents, according to the filing.

AVC/H.264 is the video codec of choice for Microsoft, which will support it natively in Internet Explorer 9, and for Apple, which is backing it as a superior alternative to Flash.

While Google also supports H.264 in Chrome, it recently open-sourced its own alternative, VP8, in a bid to provide a free alternative to the proprietary and paid-for H.264.

As part of its complaint, Nero said that MPEG-LA used its own patent counsel, Kenneth Rubenstein, as "a so-called 'independent' expert" to evaluate the essentiality of patents.

MPEG-LA had not responded at the time of writing to a request on Tuesday for comment on Nero's allegations. The next stage in the case will be for MPEG-LA to answer Nero's complaint. ""

http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/regulation/2010/05/25/mpeg-la-hit-by-antitrust-suit-over-video-codecs-40089042/

Lets See How German Tech Companies Handle the Corrupt,
UnEthical and Illegal Behavior of MPEG LA....

Ok so a Decade after Kenneth Rubenstein, Corrupt MPEG LA - Proskauer Rose Law Firm Patent Attorney, helped MPEG LA to steal the Holy Grail of Video / Technology inventions in which we all use every day and have for years upon years, well now this same Corrupt Patent Attorney is involved in more patent theft and illegal patent pool... why is Proskauer Rose standing with Kenneth Rubenstein?

I mean Christopher Wheeler was involved in this stolen patent and he was pushed out.. Kenneth Rubenstein was not even at Proskauer Rose when he first started his patent theft FOR MPEG LA to illegally pool the iviewit technologies in patent pools to hide their existence.. then Corrupt Law Firm Proskauer Rose hired Kenneth Rubenstein after he already lied to the Iviewit Company and said that he was with Proskauer Rose.. so Corrupt Law Firm - Proskauer Rose must be getting billions from MPEG LA dirty dealings or they would not have harbored a CRIMINAL for so long.. also see.. Proskauer ROSE was the reason for the Fall of Enron with this patent .. this technology theft.. and no accountable?

Well that day has come... Unless of Course Corrupt Proskauer Rose also owns judges, ethics committees, supreme courts, and patent officials in Germany as Well as the US?

I will discuss a WHOLE lot more about MPEG LA, Kenneth Rubenstein and Proskauer ROSE and the Horrible Injustice, Flat Out Fraud, Shareholder Deception, and more that surrounds MPEG LA - Proskauer Rose and Kenneth Rubenstein Corrupt Patent Attorney STEALING a Trillion Dollar Technology and Illegally Pooling this Technology in MPEG patent Pools.. all orchestrated by ONE very Corrupt Patent attorney Kenneth Rubenstein..

PS don't forget.. MPEG and APPLE are seeming quite cozy and Bruce Sewell knew about Iviewit .. while at Intel and when informed went to APPLE.. more on that later..

Collecting Royalties from Stolen Technologies and Illegal Patent Pooling,
What an Incredible Racket... Billions hand over Fist on Someone Else's Invention .. and many of these inventors are harassed, bankrupted, their cars bombed and well just plain ol' SHUT Up..

Here are some Sites for more information in the iViewit Stolen Technology and the Illegal Patent Pooling Tricks and Schemes at MPEG LA with the Help of Proskauer Rose and Kenneth Rubenstein that has created Massive Shareholder Fraud that is now a High Profile SEC Complaint and a Federal RICO Lawsuit .. still undisclosed to unsuspecting shareholders of IBM, Intel Corp, AOL, Time Warner Inc. , Lockheed Martin, Warner Bros. , SGI, and More involved in the Blatant Theft of a Trillion Dollar Technology that We all used Every Day...

www.Iviewit.TV

www.DeniedPatent.com

www.ProskauerSucks.com

www.KennethRubenstein.com

www.BruceSewell.com

www.JeffreyBewkes.com

www.CEOpaulOtellini.com

Proskauer Rose bio Clip on Kenneth Rubenstein"


" Kenneth Rubenstein is co-head of the Patent Law Group and a Partner in the New York office. He also is a registered patent attorney before the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office and a former member of the legal staff at Bell Laboratories. While there are numerous patent law groups at various firms, Ken and his group distinguish themselves from competitors by being able to deal with very sophisticated technology. "


Source
http://www.proskauer.com/professionals/Detail.aspx?professional=0eae1af8-e822-4a75-9414-d8ee3f87e890&tabId=0


posted by
Crystal L. Cox
Investigative Blogger
Crystal@CrystalCox.com

more on the MPEG LA stealing and pooling patents
.. at www.iViewit.tv/
and at www.DeniedPatent.com

Twelve Trillion Dollar, Federal RICO Lawsuit - Iviewit Stolen Patent Case.

The Florida Justice System is About as Corrupt as It Gets and the US Department of Justice, the USPTO, the SEC, the FBI, The Florida State Bar, the Florida Supreme Court and all the Corruption out of the New York Supreme Court that is protecting Proskauer Rose in all this.. well it all adds up to THERE is no Justice, and it DOES not matter how much evidence you have, the Corruption is so Thick and there is so many attorneys and judges covering up for those breaking the law and violating your rights that you don't stand a chance.

the Following is From www.Iviewit.TV and well it is some pretty sick stuff, it leaves me hopeless as to the United States Justice System doing anything but making the Rich RICHER and covering for the Criminals...

"The Cover-Up Crimes

The Twelve Trillion Dollar, Federal RICO Lawsuit “Legally Related” by Federal Judge Shira Scheindlin to the Whistleblower Anderson Lawsuit, exposes the original violations of federal, state, and international law committed to steal the technologies and additionally exposes a series of ongoing and continuous Cover-Up Crimes.

Cover-up Crimes designed to block due process through violations of Judicial Cannons, Attorney Conduct Codes, Public Office Rules and Regulations and Law, through Conflicts of Interest that act to Obstruct Justice, similar to that claimed by Anderson and committed by the many of the same Public Officials of the New York Supreme Court that Anderson fingers.

Wherever Iviewit and I filed complaints at the State Bars or disciplinary agencies under State Supreme Court aegis’ in New York, Florida and Virginia, each was later found to have MAJOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST THROUGH VIOLATIONS OF JUDICIAL CANNONS, ATTORNEY CONDUCT CODES, PUBLIC OFFICE RULES AND REGULATIONS AND LAW, CREATING THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS.

Mind blowing conflicts, so outrageous as to find Steven C. Krane, former President of the New York Bar Association, Official at the First Department DDC and one, if not thee, leading ethics lawyer in New York and Nationally, found representing complaints against his Proskauer Partners and Himself in First Department complaints, while having an Official Role at the First Department DDC where the complaints were being investigated. How unethical but true and we will return to this matter further in a moment.

Fraudulent Patent applications and Patents fraudulently issued into the names of others are crimes directly against the United States and Foreign Agencies as there are sworn oaths on the US Patent Office applications by the inventors, so filing fraudulent patents in others names is a Fraud Directly Upon the United States Patent Office and Worldwide Patent Authorities.

Crimes committed by the attorneys directly against government agencies and in violation of Federal Patent Bar Rules, State Attorney Conduct Codes and Law.

The crimes also involve not only the creation of fraudulent shell patent filings but fraudulent shell companies for the fraudulent patents to walk out the back door in, all formed by Proskauer and others not properly authorized to create such similarly named entities by the Board of Directors, Investors or management.

All these corporate crimes were violations of hosts of state and federal securities regulations and state incorporation laws, more crimes of fraud against government agencies, again committed in violation of Attorney Conduct Codes and Law.

Further, the scheme involved a false and fraudulent Billing fraud using a Florida Civil Court ( ruled by recently elected Florida Supreme Court Judge Jorge Labarga and a Defendant in the Iviewit Lawsuit ), which was filed by Proskauer Rose to the tune of $500,000 plus in Wrongful Fraudulent bills, bills designed to create false debt to the fraudulent companies they created, which contained the fraudulent patent filings.

Using this complex legal scheme which is a Fraud on a Federal Bankruptcy Court, the fraudulent companies were then to be bankrupted, after being sued for the fraudulent bills whereby the law firm and lawyers would become the largest creditors in the bankruptcy and seize the fraudulent patents hidden inside the fraudulent companies.

A plan that went extremely wrong when Arthur Andersen and others discovered that there were possible crimes being committed and fraudulent companies created and that this false information was being distributed to investors including, Wayne Huizenga, Ellen DeGeneres, Alanis Morissette, Crossbow Ventures and the Small Business Administration.

The SBA through Crossbow’s SBA loans which were two thirds of the money Crossbow invested makes the US Government one of the most aggrieved investors in Iviewit.

The Proskauer Fraudulent Billing Scheme popped up on the horizon at or around the same time the Iviewit companies were in process to close the $25 Million Private Placement financing deal with Wachovia Securities.

No one other than the conspirators of the RICO crimes knew about these illegal legal actions.

The Involuntary Bankruptcy was another legal scheme involving this time, Fraud on a Federal Bankruptcy Court, orchestrated by Proskauer Rose referred management Brian Utley and Michael Reale both formerly with IBM and Real 3D Inc. ( Intel, SGI and Lockheed ) on a fraudulent company with fraudulent inventions inside it.

On or about this time, Intel, a minority 20% owner of Real 3D, suddenly bought Real 3D from Lockheed the 70% owner and SGI, a 10% owner, in a publicly undisclosed transaction, taking with it the Iviewit inventions which now are alleged to be on almost EVERY chip manufactured since 1998.

Through the bankruptcy the underlying IP for the inventions would have become owned by the largest creditors to the fraudulent companies, Proskauer Rose and Real 3D.

Again, neither of these illegal legal actions constituting frauds on the courts, the Fraud on the Florida State Court in The Proskauer Fraudulent Billing Lawsuit or the Fraud on the Federal Bankruptcy Court via the illegal Involuntary Bankruptcy were disclosed to Wachovia, Investors, Auditors, Investment Bankers, Shareholders or Management by Proskauer or Foley.

At first, upon learning of the billing lawsuit and Involuntary Bankruptcy, it was unclear why these ILLEGAL legal actions existed and what the motive was, still much of the conspiracy remains unknown but at that time very little was known.

Only later, while investigating the falsified patent applications with the US Patent Office was it discovered that there were fraudulent patents inside the fraudulent similarly named companies involved in the IB, a company that Proskauer created, then sued and then with their referred co-conspirators filed the Involuntary Bankruptcy against.

Companies created without authorization of Shareholders, the Board of Directors or the Investors, and, where the real owners of the fraudulent companies are still unknown and subject of ongoing investigations and calls for Acts of Congress from the US Patent Office to get information regarding the inventions that were involved in the illegal legal schemes and frauds on the courts.

Upon learning of the corporate crimes from Arthur Andersen and much of the information regarding the fraudulent legal schemes by AOLTW / Warner Bros. who were doing due diligence for the Wachovia PPM when they discovered the undisclosed actions, including information that patents filed at the USPTO were not those being given to prospective investors and more.

Immediately, Iviewit retained counsel to investigate if the Billing Lawsuit, the Involuntary Bankruptcy and the thefts of the IP were realities.

Counsel retained by Iviewit found that indeed there were these illegal legal actions and frauds and that the Board of Directors, Management, Investors, Investment Bankers had no knowledge and in fact were distributing the Wachovia PPM which neither mentions the Lawsuit, the Utley IP and other fraudulent IP or the Involuntary Bankruptcy.

Iviewit threw out counsel that was representing the matters without authorization or retainers from the Iviewit companies and that time it was still unknown these companies were fraudulent, as they were similarly and identically named to the legitimate companies and Iviewit counsel began representing the matters instantly.

The Involuntary Bankruptcy found that Brian Utley, Reale and Real 3d all had no employment contract or ANY binding agreement with the Iviewit company they filed against and that matter instantly went away, as soon as, it was discovered.

On the Fraudulent Billing Lawsuit, well Proskauer Rose was not so lucky, counsel retained filed a Counter Complaint exposing the basics of the fraud known at the time, I submit this Counter Complaint to this Committee for review, as it too is subject to ongoing federal investigations11.

Again, in this fraud, Proskauer Rose was found suing companies they had no retainers with and the bills were not even in the companies sued names but the judge, Jorge Labarga, refused to even acknowledge the Counter Complaint, filed by Competent Counsel, alleging that the lawyers in the Fraudulent Billing Lawsuit perhaps were involved in crimes against the United States and Foreign Nations.

Jorge Labarga refusing the Counter Complaint and then illegally throwing the Lawsuit out but ruling a default judgment against Iviewit for the entire amount of the fraudulent bill, for failure to retain replacement counsel. It should be noted that Labarga on the eve of trial, cancelled the trial with no notice to Iviewit who showed up with two law firms representing their interests.

At the rescheduling hearing, Jorge Labarga dismissed both of Iviewit’s counsel and forced Iviewit to get new counsel for this most complex case in just a few days.

In fact, I submit to this Committee evidence that Jorge Labarga was aware of Kenneth Rubenstein, Christopher C. Wheeler, William Dick and Brian Utley’s perjurious statements made to his court, under deposition and in response to Bar Complaints, whereby perjured statements were proven prior to his throwing the case.

In one instance, Iviewit Patent Counsel Kenneth Rubenstein makes representation that he is being harassed to come to deposition in the matter as he knows nothing about Iviewit or the Iviewit inventions and inventors and refused to be deposed.

Jorge Labarga had no legal basis to block the deposition so he ordered Rubenstein to deposition, where it became apparent that Kenneth Rubenstein had LIED and PERJURED HIMSELF to the Court and knew far more about Iviewit than his sworn statements12.

Despite this damning and irrefutable evidence of Perjury to his court, Jorge Labarga ruled against Iviewit and buried the case for an undisclosed amount.

Again, information relevant to the case fraud has been submitted to Federal and State authorities.

Who owns all these fraudulent companies remains under investigation and all relevant information pertaining to these crimes have also been submitted to Federal and State Authorities and evidence, witness statements, copies of the fraudulent IP and much more are available in the Evidence Section of the Iviewit Homepage with over 1000 exhibits and hereby incorporated by reference in entirety herein for this Committee.

Crimes that if prosecuted would have taken down these powerful law firms overnight and put many of the perpetrators behind bars for more years than Madoff, as these crimes involved crimes directly against Federal, State and International Government Agencies, not merely Iviewit.

As soon as order is restored to the courts handling these matters in conflict and the corruption plaguing the New York Court system as further supported by Anderson regarding these matters is exterminated, these criminals cloaked as law firms and lawyers will be behind bars for eternity with loss of the entire partnerships assets in a successful RICO prosecution.

Knowing that it was all or nothing for the powerful law firms, they had to block due process at every venue at the highest levels, as if any of the complaints, court proceedings or investigations elevated the Billions of Dollars of revenue these firms generate would be gone and legal robes exchanged for prison garb.

Herein lies the motive for the Cover-Up Crimes and Mass of Conflicts of Interest and Violations of virtually all Attorney Conduct Codes, Judicial Cannons, Public Office Violations and Law that have infected these matters at present.

So thick are the Conflicts that not one person out of all of the courts, disciplinary agencies, law enforcement agencies, even this Committee have signed the requested Conflict of Interest Disclosure Forms provided prior to taking action in the matters.

I have provided a Conflict form for the Committee submitted with my Prepared Statement for the June 08, 2009 hearing that did not happen and again have submitted one accompanying this Prepared Statement for my testimony today, again I respectfully demand signing of this COI before the Committee takes action in anyway that may have any impact good or bad on my case.
New York Ethics Complaints Filed in 2003 and Dismissed Without Investigation; The Commissioner of Patents for the US Patent Office and Harry I. Moatz, Director of OED of the US Patent Office lead Federal Investigation of Same Attorneys State Bars and Disciplinary Agencies Dismissed without Investigation; West Palm Beach FBI Joins Patent Fraud Investigation Regarding Fraud Directly Upon the USPTO.

I filed complaints of professional misconduct instantly against Proskauer Rose, Kenneth Rubenstein, Christopher Wheeler, Meltzer, Raymond Joao, Foley and William Dick and continuously since 2003 alleged a host of professional misconduct, adding new Defendants in my lawsuit who became involved in the Cover-Up Crimes such as Krane, Cahill, the First Department and more.

Copies of the complaints can be found on the homepage or in the written Prepared Statement submitted herein to the Committee and in the Exhibit Section at the end of the document and for inclusion into this Committees permanent record, as promised by members of this Committee in accepting this statement.

I also note for this Committee that I fully reported the Iviewit Frauds on the courts committed by those adjudicating the matters in conflicts in both the courts and state disciplinary agencies, to the West Palm Beach FBI office.

Special Agent Stephen Lucchesi of that office was already investigating the Iviewit companies’ allegations of Frauds, Fraud on the USPTO, Intellectual Property Theft, Death Threats and the Attempted Murder by Car Bombing of my Family Mini-Van in Boynton Beach, Florida.

According to the FBI, later, Lucchesi and the Iviewit files went, and remain missing at this time, although upon last speaking to Lucchesi, he was on his way to the US Patent Office to begin investigating the Fraud on the US Patent Office with investigators at the US Patent Office.

Moatz confirmed that Lucchesi was in fact working with the US Patent Office regarding the Frauds on the USPTO.

The reporting of these public office crimes to the FBI and the missing investigator, led the FBI West Palm Beach Office to direct me to speak only with the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility ( OPR ) the department responsible for handling misconduct complaints against DOJ & US attorneys. When OPR refused to speak with me, claiming they could not speak with private citizens, Inspector General of the DOJ, Glenn Fine’s Office interceded and the matters where then directed to Alberto Gonzales, then to Michael Mukasey both of them who failed to respond to formal written complaints prior to them fleeing or being forced out of office.

The matters have now been forwarded on to US Attorney General, Eric Holder, Jr. and while we await response from Holder at this time, we have not had a response yet.

Perhaps he is busy investigating the crimes of lawyers for war crimes or the crimes of lawyers in politicizing the DOJ, or the torture memo lawyers who violated international torture treatises and more or perhaps he is busy investigating the lawyers behind the financial market meltdown who have destroyed our economy for the benefit of a few, mostly criminals disguised as lawyers.

A Copy of the Letter to President Barack Obama and Holder can found on the Iviewit Homepage or @

http://Iviewit.tv/CompanyDocs/United%20States%20District%20Court%20Southern%20District%20NY/20090213%20FINAL%20SIGNED%20LETTER%20OBAMA%20TO%20ENJOIN%20US%20ATTORNEY%20FINGERED%20ORIGINAL%20MAIL%20l.pdf

and http://Iviewit.tv/CompanyDocs/20080411%20Iviewit%20Response%20to%20FBI%20OPR%20letter%20signed%20sent%20and%20printed%20copy.pdf

Ultimately, Iviewit filed a Complaint of Professional Misconduct against NYS First Dept Disciplinary Committee Chief Counsel Cahill, when it was learned that Cahill had allowed Steven C. Krane of Proskauer, an active Official of the First Department to handle complaints against Proskauer Rose and Proskauer Partner Kenneth Rubenstein and ultimately himself, Iviewit filed further complaints for Violations of Public Office, Violations of Attorney Conduct Codes and Violations of Law against all of them.

Yes, Steven C Krane represented the complaints filed against his firm, partners and himself, all the while concealing multiple conflicts of interest and violations of public offices at the First Department which excluded from such twisted representation.

In Florida at the State Bar we find similarly
Proskauer partner Matthew Triggs

While Krane was handling the complaints he was a member of the First Department and kept this Conflict undisclosed while he levied responses on behalf of his clients Proskauer Rose and Kenneth Rubenstein that were attempts to smear the Iviewit companies and myself, claiming Iviewit was a failed dot com and that Kenneth Rubenstein never heard of Iviewit and that Proskauer knew nothing about the patents, all while failing to disclose his First Department Roles and CONFLICT.

Krane, also in his role at the time as immediate past PRESIDENT of the NYSBA had public office rules barring his handling of disciplinary complaints for a period of one year after his service.

His representations of his firm and Proskauer Rose falling within that blackout and Krane again fails to disclose this Public Office Rule and Regulation that prevented his representation.

It is interesting to note that without knowing of the concealed conflicts and violations of public offices at the time, how the complaints within the First Department, despite the overwhelming evidence presented to the State Bar and Disciplinary Committees and despite the fact that the Federal Patent Bar, USPTO, USPTO OED and FBI were investigating them, how the state complaints had been “Stalled” Indefinitely. It was not until discovering the conflicts that it became overwhelming apparent.

Iviewit has found Proskauer or Foley in every instance where there was dismissal with no investigation by a State Bar or Disciplinary, much later into the investigations, the Conflicts of Interest and Violations of Public Offices that acted as the glue that bound the Cover-Up causing the delays and dismissals without investigation, even as the First Department Court Unanimously Ordered Krane and the others for formal and procedural “INVESTIGATIONS” based on the Krane and Cahill conflict information.

It was only recently exposed in July 2007 that the underlying "Patentgate" inquiries were effectively buried, or derailed, under the leadership of Manhattan's top State ethics Chief Counsel, Thomas J. Cahill, Esq. Cahill's "retirement" was then quickly announced after his own ethical failings in the Patentgate matter and other unfolding scandal as Anderson began surfacing with Whistleblower allegations, along with other ethics complaints that were made, became known.

Then the Whistleblower Anderson came along to confirm ones worst nightmares about the Disciplinary Committees and Courts of New York. It should be noted that Cahill was later deposed in Anderson. From an article in Expose Corrupt Courts, I quote,

July 16 2007 DOJ Widens Patentgate Inquiry:

In a letter dated July 16, 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, announced from its Washington, D.C. headquarters that it was expanding its investigation into a bizarrely stalled FBI investigation that involves an almost surreal story of the theft of nearly 30 U.S. Patents, and other intellectual property, worth billions of dollars.

The probe reaches some of New York's most prominent politicians and judges, and has already proven to be a stunning embarrassment to the State's ethics watchdog committees.

The Fox and the Hen House
It was only recently exposed in July that the underlying “Patentgate” inquiries were effectively buried, or derailed, under the leadership of Manhattan’s top State ethics Chief Counsel, Thomas J. Cahill, Esq. Mr. Cahill’s “retirement” was then quickly announced after his own ethical failings in the Patentgate matter, along with other ethics complaints that were made, became known.

While no one can exactly figure out how inquiries under Mr. Cahill’s charge went so awry, one thing is certain. At the same time the Patentgate probes were being secreted by state officials in New York, the United States Patent and Trademark Office Patent bar increased their own investigation into the same matter implicating the same attorneys. (Note: Mr. Cahill’s replacement was recently decided, and an announcement is expected as early as next week by the Appellate Division, First Department Presiding Justice, Jonathan Lippman.)

Article @ http://exposecorruptcourts.blogspot.com/2007/08/justice-dept-widens-patentgate-probe.html

The Damning Whistleblower Case of Christine C. Anderson –Allegations of Coercion, Assault, Title 18 and State Obstruction of Justice via Official Supreme Court Document Destruction Inside the First Department by Public Officials, for “Favored Law Firms”
Christine Anderson provides a pivotal link in her heroic Whistleblowing revelations that shed insight into the criminal behavior running rampant at the highest levels of the First Department, including Coercion, Obstruction, Tampering with Official Investigatory Files, Threatening Federal Witnesses, Document Destruction and Physical Assaults on a Whistleblower tying Iviewit to her own complaint.

Anderson’s original lawsuit filing discussed the impact of Iviewit on her situation relating to a Complaint filed against Cahill and others13, as part of her allegations. Anderson’s Original Complaint can be found at Iviewit Homepage, Evidence Link or @

http://iviewit.tv/CompanyDocs/United%20States%20District%20Court%20Southern%20District%20NY/anderson/20071028%20Anderson%20Original%20Filing.pdf

Pages 24-25 contain references to the Iviewit Cahill, Krane et al. complaints.

Christine C. Anderson a former Staff Attorney at the First Dept filed WHISTLEBLOWER allegations in a Fed Whistleblower suit slated for trial Oct 13 in US District Court Southern District NY (USDC), Anderson v State of NY, 07cv09599.

http://iviewit.tv/press/press1.pdf

Anderson’s suit adjudicated by Judge Shira Scheindlin contains allegations of retaliation against Anderson for termination from her job of 6 years, after Anderson exposed systemic Whitewashing & Obstruction inside the First Dept, claiming favoritism by the First Dept for favored law firms & attorneys.

I have attached in my Prepared Statement links to several news articles relating to Anderson.

http://exposecorruptcourts.blogspot.com/2009/04/andersons-10-million-lawsuit-proceeds.html & http://iviewit.tv/press/press2.pdf

Anderson’s suit set to bring volcanic like testimony involving Public Office corruption & testimony by officials of the NY State Unified Court system, including Court of Appeals Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman, Presiding Judge at the First Dept during the firing of Anderson. Along with Lippman will be Defendants in Anderson, First Dept Supervisor Sherry Cohen, Former Chief Counsel Thomas J. Cahill, Hon John Buckley, David Spokony & Catherine O’Hagen Wolfe, Clerk @ US Second Circuit Court of Appeals (USCA), an initial Anderson defendant in her former job as Clerk for the First Dept, now witness in Anderson.

Anderson claims Physical Assault & Harassment by Cohen for her heroic WHISTLEBLOWING efforts, Anderson gave riveting testimony at the first of these hearings by the NY Senate Judiciary Committee headed by Hon. Senator John L. Sampson.

Anderson’s testimony found online and links again are provided in the written statement. Anderson’s testimony comes at 30min into the video found online at the NY State Senate Website or @ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HR8OX8uuAbw&eurl=http%3A%2F%2Fiviewit%2Etv%2F&feature=player_embedded

Prior to permitting Anderson to trial, Scheindlin marked 7 suits, including Iviewit’s Multi-Count Multi-Trillion Dollar suit http://iviewit.tv/press/press3.pdf legally “related” to Anderson.""

Source of POST
http://74.125.155.132/search?q=cache:ktIVkVh6K68J:www.iviewit.tv/20091005%2520NY%2520Judiciary%2520Committee%2520Prepared%2520Statement.doc+site://www.iviewit.tv+Reardon&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
Iviewit
More on the Stolen Iviewit Patents at
www.DeniedPatent.com
RICO
Wachovia, Bankruptcy Corruption, Brian Utley
Senator John L. Sampson